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Trade Reform and Regional Dynamics:
Evidence From 25 Years of Brazilian Matched Employer-Employee Data








We empirically study the dynamics of labor market adjustment following the Brazilian trade 
reform of the 1990s. We use variation in industry-specific tariff cuts interacted with initial 
regional industry mix to measure trade-induced local labor demand shocks, and then examine 
regional and individual labor market responses to those one-time shocks over two decades. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, we do not find that the impact of local shocks is dissipated 
over time through wage-equalizing migration. Instead, we find steadily growing effects of local 
shocks on regional formal sector wages and employment for 20 years. This finding can be 
rationalized in a simple equilibrium model with two complementary factors of production, labor 
and industry-specific factors such as capital, that adjust slowly and imperfectly to shocks. Next, 
we document rich margins of adjustment induced by the trade reform at the regional and 
individual level. Workers initially employed in harder hit regions face continuously deteriorating 
formal labor market outcomes relative to workers employed in less affected regions, and this gap 
persists even 20 years after the beginning of trade liberalization. Negative local trade shocks 
induce workers to shift out of the formal tradable sector and into the formal nontradable sector. 
Non-employment strongly increases in harder-hit regions in the medium run, but in the longer 
run, non-employed workers eventually find re-employment in the informal sector. Working age 
population does not react to these local shocks, but formal sector net migration does, consistent 
with the relative decline of the formal sector and growth of the informal sector in adversely 
affected regions.
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1 Introduction
The reallocation of resources across economic activities is a key mechanism through which increasing
openness leads to welfare gains. Prominent theories of international trade rely on the reallocation
of factors across sectors or firms in order to generate production gains from trade. However,
academic economists have traditionally paid little attention to the adjustment process, instead
focusing on long-run models where reallocation is achieved without frictions. This focus has created
a tension between academic economists advocating trade liberalization and policy makers concerned
with the labor market outcomes of workers employed in contracting sectors or firms (Salem and
Benedetto 2013, Hollweg, Lederman, Rojas and Ruppert Bulmer 2014).
Even though many countries underwent major trade liberalization episodes throughout the
1980s and 1990s (e.g., Brazil, Mexico, and India, among others), we still know very little about
the medium- to long-run consequences of these policy reforms on labor markets, particularly for
workers who were active when these reforms were implemented. Indeed, empirical studies of the
labor market effects of trade liberalization have typically emphasized short- to medium-run ef-
fects. Frequently changing designs of cross-sectional household surveys forced researchers to focus
on relatively short intervals to guarantee consistency over the periods analyzed (Goldberg and
Pavcnik 2007). Furthermore, the lack of long and comprehensive panel data during periods of
trade liberalization made it impossible to jointly study the short-, medium- and long-run effects of
trade liberalization on individual workers’ employment trajectories.
We fill this gap in the literature by studying the empirical dynamics of labor market adjustment
in response to a major trade liberalization episode. We use 25 years of matched employer-employee
data from Brazil to study the dynamics of local labor market adjustment following the country’s
trade liberalization in the early 1990s. We exploit variation in the degree of tariff declines across
industries and variation in the industry mix of local employment across Brazilian regions to measure
changes in local labor demand induced by liberalization. This approach, along with our detailed
longitudinal data, allows us to observe labor market dynamics for 20 years following the beginning
of the trade policy changes.
The results are striking. We find very large and slowly increasing regional effects on earnings,
employment, and other labor market outcomes. Workers whose regions face larger tariff declines
experience deteriorating formal labor market outcomes compared to workers in other regions (we
discuss informal outcomes below). These effects grow steadily for more than a decade before begin-
ning to level off in the late 2000s. This pattern is not driven by other post-liberalization shocks and
is robust to alternative measurement strategies. These findings challenge the conventional wisdom
that labor mobility would gradually arbitrage away spatial differences in local labor market out-
comes, leading to declining rather than increasing observed regional effects of liberalization over
time (Blanchard and Katz 1992, Bound and Holzer 2000). This suggests substantial barriers to
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inter-regional mobility, but it also implies that local labor demand in more adversely affected re-
gions keeps falling relative to the rest of the country for years following the end of the liberalization.
We provide a simple explanation for the slow growth of the regional effects based on geographical
mobility frictions for both labor and other complementary factors of production such as capital,
with these frictions mutually reinforcing each other to drive slow adjustment (Dix-Carneiro 2014).
Agglomeration economies as in Kline and Moretti (2014) are similar in spirit and consistent with
the observed patterns of adjustment, as both mechanisms generate dynamics in local labor de-
mand that persist for long periods of time following a one-time shock. We focus our theoretical
interpretation on sluggish factor adjustment because additional evidence on the regional number
of establishments, establishment entry and exit rates, and job creation and destruction rates is
supportive of the sluggish factor adjustment hypothesis. Furthermore, while both explanations can
generate the qualitative patterns we observe, these patterns are quantitatively consistent with the
slow adjustment analysis in Dix-Carneiro (2014).
The longitudinal nature of our data allows us to track individual workers over time, observing
outcomes for two otherwise identical workers who just before liberalization lived in regions that
would subsequently face different local trade shocks. Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011) pioneered
the use of administrative panel data to study trade-induced labor reallocation.1 Our paper is unique
in focusing on the dynamics of labor market effects of liberalization, documenting how these effects
vary over the medium- to long-run. We find that workers whose initial region faced a larger tariff
decline become less and less likely to be formally employed over time, and lose substantial amounts
of formal earnings in the years following liberalization. We also observe worker adjustment in the
face of negative labor demand shocks. Formal tradable sector workers facing more negative local
shocks are more likely to transition into formal nontradable sector employment, but on average
cannot offset lost tradable sector employment or earnings.2
Using supplementary data from the Decennial Census, we find that regions facing larger tariff
declines experience relative increases in informal employment. Informal sector jobs do not pro-
vide legally mandated labor protections or other benefits, and often involve lower compensation,
fewer opportunities for training and advancement, and generally less favorable working conditions
(Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007, Bacchetta, Ernst and Bustamante 2009). In harder-hit regions,
non-employment also strongly increases in the medium run, but in the longer run non-employed
individuals eventually find employment in the informal sector. These results seem to contradict
prior work, which typically finds minimal effects of trade on informality in Brazil (Goldberg and
Pavcnik 2003, Menezes-Filho and Muendler 2011, Bosch, Goñi-Pacchioni and Maloney 2012). How-
ever, our results can be reconciled based on differences in sectoral coverage, short-run vs. medium-
and long-run transitions, and different data structures. In contrast to the prior work on Brazil,
1See Krishna, Poole and Senses (2014) for another more recent example.
2Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011) also find evidence for transitions into non-manufacturing employment using
industry variation in tariff cuts and using short panels from the Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME).
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McCaig and Pavcnik (2014) find substantial shifts from household (informal) to enterprise (formal)
employment in Vietnam in response to the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement, more closely
paralleling our findings here.
Overall, geographic migration does not appear to respond to changing local labor demand
conditions. However, when restricting attention to formally employed workers in the matched
employer-employee data, we find that individuals who migrate tend to avoid adversely affected
destinations. Together, these findings suggest that regional adjustment of formal employment
occurs primarily through workers’ transitions into or out of formal employment, rather than by
migrating across space.
In contrast to much of the trade literature, we focus on regional dynamics rather than frictions
across industries or establishments. A recent literature on the local labor market effects of trade,
pioneered by Topalova (2007) in the developing country context and Autor, Dorn and Hanson
(2013) in the U.S., points toward significant mobility frictions across regions in both developing and
developed countries.3 When industries are concentrated in different regions, workers must overcome
geographical mobility barriers in order to reallocate from contracting to expanding industries or
establishments. This reallocation is essential for the economy to realize the production gains from
trade. The distinction between geographic and industry mobility frictions is also important for
policy, as the optimal policy prescriptions to minimize transitional costs, speed up reallocation,
and compensate the losers from trade liberalization will be quite different.
Only recently have researchers begun measuring reallocation costs and the dynamics of labor
market adjustment following trade policy reforms. Dix-Carneiro (2014) estimates a structural dy-
namic equilibrium model of the Brazilian labor market in which workers face various frictions in
switching sectors of employment. He then simulates a counterfactual trade liberalization episode
to study the quantitative implications of the model, including the dynamics of labor market tran-
sition and heterogeneous welfare effects on workers with different characteristics (such as age and
education). Other papers follow a similar strategy of calibrating or estimating small open economy
models in order to study their quantitative implications for welfare and their implied transitional
dynamics when facing hypothetical changes in trade policy (see Kambourov (2009), Artuç, Chaud-
huri and McLaren (2010), and Coşar (2013)). Importantly, the labor market dynamics studied in
these papers derive from the estimated structural models under consideration rather than reflect-
ing observed responses to liberalization in the data. Our paper is the first to empirically describe
transitional dynamics induced by a real-world trade reform.
In related work, Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Song (forthcoming) use U.S. panel data to study the
labor market effects of increased Chinese imports across industries. Our individual-level longitu-
3This growing literature includes Edmonds, Pavcnik and Topalova (2010), Hasan, Mitra and Ural (2006), Hasan,
Mitra, Ranjan and Ahsan (2012), McCaig (2011), Topalova (2010), Topalova (2010), Kovak (2013), Hakobyan and
McLaren (2012), Autor et al. (2013), Kondo (2014), Costa, Garred and Pessoa (2014) and others. All of these papers
point to the presence of substantial barriers to regional mobility.
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dinal analysis is similar in spirit, but differs in a number of ways. Most importantly, we study a
discrete policy shock rather than a continuously evolving phenomenon like Chinese export growth.
This allows us to study the subsequent dynamics following liberalization without the confound-
ing influence that occurs with a continually evolving shock. We focus on regional rather than
industry shocks and study formal sector migration and population responses to regional shocks.
Finally, we examine various margins of adjustment, including shifts into informal employment, non-
employment, and transitions between tradable and nontradable sector employment, all of which
are salient features of the Brazilian context.
As an additional contribution, we examine administrative employer-employee data alongside
more commonly available household survey data from the Brazilian Decennial Census of Population.
When possible, we corroborate the findings across the two datasets and find quite consistent results.
Given the growing popularity of matched employer-employee data, it is encouraging that results
from more traditional cross-sectional data sources are similar.
To summarize, our paper makes contributions to five strands of the international, labor and de-
velopment economics literatures. First, this is the first paper empirically describing the transitional
labor market dynamics that arise in response to a major trade liberalization episode. Second, we
complement a growing literature on the local labor market effects of trade by studying the dynam-
ics of these effects and putting existing static results into context. Third, our findings challenge
the conventional wisdom in the labor economics literature that the impact of local shocks will be
gradually dissipated through equalizing migration. We provide a theoretical interpretation for these
findings and present additional empirical evidence in support of that interpretation. Fourth, we are
the first to document the medium- to long-run effects of a major trade policy reform by following
workers over time and across sectors and regions. Fifth, we find novel results regarding the effect of
trade policy changes on informality in Brazil and reconcile our findings with those of the existing
literature.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the history and institutional context of
Brazil’s early 1990s trade liberalization. Section 3 describes the data sources, including the matched
employer-employee panel and cross-sectional data that we utilize, and describes our definition of
local labor markets. Section 4 introduces a model of local labor markets with slow factor adjustment
and presents our empirical approach, including a theoretically motivated regional measure of trade
liberalization. Section 5 presents the empirical findings for our regional analysis, and Section 6
presents the empirical results in the individual analysis. Section 7 examines outcomes relating to
the informal sector, and Section 8 concludes.
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2 Trade Liberalization in Brazil
Brazil’s trade liberalization in the early 1990s provides an excellent setting in which to study the
labor market effects of changes in trade policy. The unilateral trade liberalization involved very large
declines in average trade barriers and featured substantial variation in tariff cuts across industries.
Many papers have examined the labor market effects of trade liberalization in the Brazilian context
to take advantage of this variation.4
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Brazil ended nearly one hundred years of extremely high
trade barriers imposed as part of an import substituting industrialization policy.5 In 1987, nominal
tariffs were very high, but the degree of protection actually experienced by a given industry often
deviated substantially from the nominal tariff rate due to i) a variety of non-tariff barriers such
as suspended import licenses for many goods and ii) a system of “special customs regimes” that
lowered or removed tariffs for many transactions (Kume, Piani and de Souza 2003).6 In 1988 and
1989, in an effort to increase transparency in trade policy, the government reduced tariff redundancy
by cutting nominal tariffs and eliminating certain special regimes and trade-related taxes, but there
was no effect on the level of protection faced by Brazilian producers (Kume 1990).
Liberalization began in March 1990, when the newly elected administration of President Collor
suddenly and unexpectedly abolished the list of suspended import licenses and removed nearly
all of the remaining special customs regimes (Kume et al. 2003). These policies were replaced by
a set of import tariffs providing the same protective structure, as measured by the gap between
prices internal and external to Brazil, in a process known as tariffication (tarificação) (de Carvalho,
Jr. 1992). In some industries, this process required modest tariff increases to account for the lost
protection from abolishing import bans.7 Although these changes did not substantially affect the
protective structure, they left tariffs as the main instrument of trade policy, such that tariff levels
in 1990 and later provide an accurate measure of protection.
The main phase of trade liberalization occurred between 1990 and 1995, with a gradual reduction
in import tariffs culminating with the introduction of Mercosur. Tariffs fell from an average of 30.5
percent to 12.8 percent, and remained relatively stable thereafter.8 Along with this large average
4Examples include Arbache, Dickerson and Green (2004), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003), Gonzaga, Filho and
Terra (2006), Kovak (2013), Krishna et al. (2014), Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011), Pavcnik, Blom, Goldberg
and Schady (2004), Paz (2014), Schor (2004), and Soares and Hirata (2014) among many others.
5Although Brazil was a founding signatory of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, it
maintained high trade barriers through an exemption in Article XVIII Section B, granted to developing countries
facing balance of payments problems (Abreu 2004). Hence trade policy changes during the period under study were
unilateral.
6These policies were imposed quite extensively. In January 1987, 38 percent of individual tariff lines were subject
to suspended import licenses, which effectively banned imports of the goods in question (Authors’ calculations from
Bulletin International des Douanes no 6 v11 supplement 2). In 1987, 74 percent of imports were subject to a special
customs regime (de Carvalho, Jr. 1992).
7Figure A1 in Appendix A shows the time series of tariffs. Note the tariff increases in 1990 for the auto and
electronic equipment industries.
8Simple averages of tariff rates across Nivel 50 industries, as reported in (Kume et al. 2003).
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decline came substantial heterogeneity in tariff cuts across industries, with some industries such as
agriculture and mining facing small tariff changes, and others such as apparel and rubber facing
declines of more than 30 percentage points. In this paper, we measure liberalization using long-
differences in tariffs during the period of liberalization, from 1990 to 1995. Specifically, we use
changes in the log of one plus the tariff rate, shown in Figure 1. During this time period, tariffs
accurately measure the degree of protection faced by Brazilian producers and reflect the full extent
of liberalization faced by each industry. We do not rely on the timing of tariff cuts between 1990
and 1995, because this timing was chosen to maintain support for the liberalization plan, cutting
tariffs on intermediate inputs earlier and consumer goods later (Kume et al. 2003).
As discussed below, along with regional differences in industry mix, the cross-industry varia-
tion in tariff cuts provides the identifying variation in our analysis. Following the argument in
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005), we note that the tariff cuts were nearly perfectly correlated with the
pre-liberalization tariff levels (correlation coefficient = -0.90). These initial tariff levels reflected a
protective structure initially imposed in 1957 (Kume et al. 2003), decades before liberalization. This
feature left little scope for political economy concerns that might otherwise have driven system-
atic endogeneity of tariff cuts to counterfactual industry performance. To check for any remaining
spurious correlation between tariff cuts and other steadily evolving industry factors, we regress
pre-liberalization (1980-1991) changes in industry employment and wage premia on the 1990-1995
tariff changes, with detailed results reported in Appendix A.2. We attempted a variety of alterna-
tive specifications and emphasize that the results should be interpreted with care, as they include
only 20 tradable industry observations. Most specifications exhibit no statistically significant rela-
tionship, but heteroskedasticity-weighted specifications place heavy weight on agriculture and find
a negative relationship. Agriculture was initially the least protected industry, and it experienced
approximately no tariff change. It also had declining wages and employment before liberalization,
driving the negative relationship. Consistent with earlier work, when omitting agriculture, tariff-
cuts are unrelated to pre-liberalization earnings trends (Krishna, Poole and Senses 2011). Given
these varying results, we include controls for pre-liberalization outcome trends in all of the analyses
presented below to account for any potential spurious correlation. Consistent with the notion that
the tariff changes were exogenous in practice, these pre-trend controls have little influence on the
vast majority of our results.
3 Data
In this paper, we use two main data sources, the Relação Annual de Informações Sociais (RAIS),
and the Decennial Census of Population. RAIS is a matched employer-employee dataset assembled
by the Brazilian Ministry of Labor every year since 1976 and provides a high quality census of
the Brazilian formal labor market (De Negri, de Castro, de Souza and Arbache 2001, Saboia and
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Tolipan 1985). We utilize RAIS data spanning the period from 1986 to 2010. The Census is a
traditional household survey covering the entire population, including informally employed and
non-employed workers. We use Census data from 1970-2010.
Originally, RAIS was created as an operational tool for the Brazilian government to i) monitor
the entry of foreign workers into the labor market; ii) oversee the records of the FGTS program
(a national benefits program consisting of employers’ contributions to each of its employees); iii)
provide information for administering several government benefits programs such as unemployment
insurance; and iv) generate statistics regarding the formal labor market. Today it is the main tool
used by the government to enable the payment of the ”abono salarial” to eligible workers. This is
a government program that pays one additional minimum wage at the end of the year to workers
whose average monthly wage was not greater than two times the minimum wage, and whose job
information was correctly declared in RAIS, among other minor requirements. Thus, workers have
an incentive to ensure that their employer is filing the required information. Moreover, firms are
required to file, and face fines until they do so. RAIS includes all formally employed workers,
meaning those with a signed work card, providing them access to all of the benefits and labor
protections afforded them by the legal employment system. It omits those without signed work
cards, including interns, the self-employed, elected officials, domestic workers, and other minor
employment categories. These data have recently been employed by Menezes-Filho and Muendler
(2011), Helpman, Itskhoki, Muendler and Redding (2014), Lopes de Melo (2013), Krishna et al.
(2014), and Dix-Carneiro (2014), though these papers utilize a shorter panel.
The data consist of job records identified by both a worker ID number (PIS) and an estab-
lishment registration number (CNPJ). These identifiers are unique and do not change over time,
allowing us to track workers over time and across establishments. Establishment-level information
includes geographic location (municipality), industry (IBGE subsector9), and worker-level informa-
tion includes gender, age, education (9 categories), December earnings, average monthly earnings,
tenure, occupation, month of accession into the job (if accession occurred during the current year)
and month of separation (if any). Throughout the analysis, we limit our sample to include working-
age individuals, aged 18-64, and unless otherwise noted, focus on labor market outcomes reported
in December of each year.10
These data have various advantages relative to previous work on the effects of trade on local
labor markets. First, relative to Kovak (2013) and Autor et al. (2013), we can analyze the dynamics
of adjustment to the trade liberalization shock, as RAIS data are available every year and because
RAIS is representative at fine geographic levels by including the universe of formally employed
9The IBGE subsector classification includes 12 manufacturing industries, 2 primary industries, 11 nontradable
industries, and 1 other/ignored.
10In the regional analysis, we also omit individuals working in public administration and those reporting
other/ignored sectors. We impose additional age restrictions and other sample restrictions in the individual-level
analysis, described in Section 6.
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workers in every Brazilian municipality.11 The dynamic patterns we document below would be
unobservable using standard household survey or Census data. Second, a very rich set of labor
market outcomes can be analyzed with such data, including how liberalization affected i) the
duration of non-formal labor market spells; ii) job creation and job destruction rates; iii) the
number of active establishments; and iv) the establishment size distribution. Third, the ability to
follow workers over time and across establishments and municipalities allows us to analyze the short-
, medium- and long-run effects of the reform on individuals’ labor market trajectories controlling
for observable worker characteristics, including individuals’ industry and region of employment
just before the policy shock. Fourth, we study a discrete policy shock and observe outcomes for
20 years following the beginning of liberalization, allowing us to study the dynamic response to
this well-defined trade policy shock. This contrasts with Autor et al. (forthcoming), who use U.S.
panel data to study the effects of growing trade with China. They emphasize that the continuously
evolving nature of Chinese trade confounds their ability to study the dynamic response to a trade
shock at any given point in time.
As is typically the case in matched employer-employee datasets, the limitation of RAIS is a
lack of information on workers who are not formally employed. It is therefore impossible to tell
whether a worker is out of the labor force, unemployed, informally employed, or self-employed.
This is important in the Brazilian context, with informality rates reaching over 50% of all employed
workers during the period under scrutiny.12 However, we can infer when the worker is not employed
in the formal labor market and examine spells outside of formal employment.
To address this limitation, we supplement the RAIS data with five rounds of the Brazilian
Demographic Census: 1970, 1980, 1991, 2000, and 2010. While these data provide much smaller
samples and do not permit following individual workers over time, they cover all individuals, in-
cluding the informally employed, unemployed, and those outside the labor force. This allows us to
examine trade liberalization’s effect on informality, employment, and other outcomes for workers
outside formal employment. Moreover, with the increasing availability and popularity of matched
employer-employee data, it is useful to compare the empirical relationships in these types of data
with those in more traditional cross-sectional surveys. When possible, we corroborate results from
RAIS using the Demographic Census, finding very similar results across datasets.
To analyze outcomes by local labor market, we must define the boundaries of each market. We
use the “microregion” definition of the Brazilian Statistical Agency (IBGE), which groups together
economically integrated contiguous municipalities (counties) with similar geographic and productive
characteristics (IBGE 2002), closely paralleling an intuitive notion of a local labor market. When
necessary, we combine microregions whose boundaries changed during our sample period to ensure
11The National Household Survey (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domićılios - PNAD) would be a natural
alternative data source for a yearly analysis, but it only provides geographic information at the state level, does not
allow one to follow individual workers over time, and provides a much smaller sample.
12Authors’ calculations using Brazilian Demographic Census.
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that we consistently define local labor markets from 1980-2010.13 This process leads to a set of 475
consistently identifiable local labor markets.14
4 Empirical Framework
4.1 Model of Local Labor Markets with Factor Adjustment
Given our focus on the dynamic regional effects of trade liberalization, we develop a specific-
factors model of regional economies that allows for imperfect and slow regional factor adjustment
in response to changing local conditions. The model yields a tractable measure of liberalization-
induced local labor demand shocks that parallels the empirical approach used throughout the
literature on the local effects of trade.15 By allowing for the possibility of imperfect and slow factor
adjustment, the model can also accommodate the dynamic evolution of outcomes that we document
below.
The national economy consists of many regions, r, each of which may produce goods in many
industries, i. Following Jones (1975), each region is endowed with a vector of industry-specific
factors, Tri, and a stock of regional labor, Lr, that is costlessly mobile across industries. Goods
and factor markets are competitive. Production is Cobb-Douglas, and specific-factor shares, ϕi,
may vary across industries. Hats represent proportional changes. Producers in all regions face
the same vector of national price changes, P̂i. Kovak (2013) studies a similar model in which
local factor supplies are fixed. Here we allow the amounts of labor and specific factors to vary
in response to liberalization. We solve this variation of the model in Appendix B, yielding the

























13This geographic classification is a slightly aggregated version of the one in Kovak (2013), accounting for additional
boundary changes during the longer sample period. Related papers define local markets based on commuting patterns
(e.g. Autor et al. (2013)). Our local market definition performs well based on this standard as well – only 3.4 and
4.6 percent of individuals lived and worked in different markets in 2000 and 2010, respectively.
14The regional definition is shown in Figure 3. The analysis omits 11 microregions, shown with a cross-hatched
pattern the figure. These include i) Manaus, which was part of a Free Trade Area and hence not subject to tariff
cuts during liberalization; ii) the microregions that constitute the state of Tocantins, which was created in 1988 and
hence not consistently identifiable throughout our sample period; and iii) a few other municipalities that are omitted
from RAIS in the 1980s. The inclusion or exclusion of these regions when possible has no substantive effect on the
results. We also implemented the main analyses using a more aggregate local labor market definition, “mesoregions”
defined by IBGE, and results are nearly identical.
15See footnote 3 for examples.
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and λri is the share of regional labor initially allocated to tradable industry i. Although we do
not explicitly model the nontradable sector, we follow Kovak (2013) by omitting nontradables
from the sums in (1), based on the idea that nontradables prices move with tradables prices, such
that dropping them closely approximates the ideal measure. Also, while (1) measures proportional
changes in nominal regional wages, if the nontradable goods’ share of consumption is constant across
regions, and trade balances at the regional level, then local real nominal wage changes are given
by a linear transformation of nominal wage changes.16 In this case, although real wage changes are
smaller than nominal wage changes, the explanatory power of regional tariff shocks is unchanged.
Real versus nominal wage effects aside, note that our findings below point toward large effects on
real local labor market outcomes such as formal and informal employment, unemployment, and
spells out of the formal sector.
We apply this model to the formal sector, in which workers have access to legally mandated
rights and benefits. Labor supply (L̂r) can therefore adjust either through interregional migration
or through shifts out of formal employment. In the Brazilian context, informal employment tends to
be an absorbing state, as the costs to enter formal employment are very large (Dix-Carneiro 2014).
We think of specific factor reallocation (T̂ri) as reflecting capital depreciation in one region and
new investment in another region, which occurs slowly over time. We further assume that if an
industry was not active in a region at the onset of trade liberalization, fixed costs of building a new
industry from scratch are high enough that the industry will not emerge following liberalization.
To fix ideas, define the “regional price change” as P̂r ≡
∑
i βriP̂i, and imagine estimating the
following reduced-form regression, using data generated by the model described in (1).
ŵr = α+ θP̂r + νr, (2)
This specification parallels the approach in the literature on the local effects of trade and is a
simplified version of the regional estimation strategy we use below in Section 5. Changing factor
supplies appearing in the rightmost term in (1) are omitted from (2), and hence are incorporated into
the error term. Since (1) represents an equilibrium relationship where changes in factor quantities L̂r
and T̂ri are themselves functions of changes in factor payments, these supply shifts are endogenous.
17
Thus, the observed wage effect, captured in the reduced-form OLS estimate of θ, depends upon the
correlation between changing factors supplies in νr and the regional price change, P̂r.
With factor supplies fixed (L̂r = T̂ri = 0), there will be no such correlation, and we would
expect the estimate of θ to be constant over time and close to one. In this case, the wage change
16With constant nontradable consumption shares across regions, and balanced trade region by region, the change
in real wage is simply the change in nominal wage scaled down by the tradable goods’ share of consumption, plus a
term that is constant across regions and drops out of the analysis. See footnote 13 in Kovak (2011) for details.
17In principle, one could specify a functional form for the factor supply process to close the model, but the main
insights are unchanged when considering general factor adjustment patterns. We have solved a version of the model
with a particular functional form for factor supplies, and results are available upon request.
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in (1) equals the weighted average of proportional price changes, with weights determined by the
region’s industry mix, reflected in βri. Although all regions face the same set of price changes,
regions specializing in goods facing larger price declines experience larger wage declines. This
weighted average therefore captures the intuitive idea, initially explored by Topalova (2007), that
regions experience larger declines in labor demand when their most important industries face larger
liberalization-induced price declines. Thus, with factor supplies held fixed, regions facing larger
price declines for their most important products would experience relative wage declines, but the
model would not include any mechanism to generate wage or employment dynamics.
Now, continue to hold specific factor quantities fixed (T̂ri = 0), but allow the quantity of labor to
vary. In this case, the model predicts large wage effects just after liberalization, followed by a period
of declining regional wage differences as labor reallocates, arbitraging away wage differences across
markets. Specifically, assume that employment falls in regions facing more negative labor demand
shocks, such that cov(P̂r, L̂r) > 0. Since δr > 0, this reallocation partly equalizes the wage changes
across regions, driving down the estimated value of θ. Now allow L̂r to vary over time, always
measuring changes relative to a fixed pre-liberalization base year. If reallocation continues over
time, then cov(P̂r, L̂r) becomes steadily more positive, and one would observe a steadily declining
regional wage effect of liberalization. This pattern captures the conventional wisdom in the labor
literature, which focuses on worker mobility’s role in arbitraging spatial differences in labor market
outcomes (Blanchard and Katz 1992, Bound and Holzer 2000).
In contrast to the declining wage effects predicted by labor adjustment alone, when one allows
both labor and specific factor supplies to vary, complex patterns can emerge. In fact, in sharp
contrast to the conventional wisdom, the empirical analyses in Sections 5 and 6 find steadily growing
regional wage and employment effects of liberalization. This pattern can be rationalized by the
model if cov(P̂r, L̂r −
∑
i λriT̂ri) declines over time. Changes in this covariance are determined by
the relative speed of labor and specific factor adjustment. Consistent with the empirical results
below, we restrict attention to situations where both labor and specific factors reallocate toward
regions with higher factor returns, such that cov(P̂r, L̂r) > 0 and cov(P̂r,
∑
i λriT̂ri) > 0.
18 If
both labor and specific factors reallocate slowly, their respective covariances with P̂r will increase
over time. As an example, if labor reallocates a bit more quickly at first and capital reallocates
more quickly later, then cov(P̂r, L̂r −
∑
i λriT̂ri) declines over time, and the estimated effect of
liberalization grows over time. Intuitively, when labor and complementary factors adjust slowly,
they create a mutually reinforcing incentive for factors to flow away from less favorably affected
regions; declining local employment lowers the return to capital, and declining local capital lowers
the return to labor. Dix-Carneiro (2014) Section 7.4 studies a similar mechanism in the context of
inter-industry reallocation, showing quantitatively that slow capital adjustment can drive increasing
18Appendix B shows that the average specific factor return falls more (increases less) in regions with more negative
values of P̂r, such that labor and specific-factors have the incentive to reallocate in the same direction.
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industry-specific wage effects over long periods of time.
Slow factor adjustment can therefore rationalize a steady growth in regional wage and employ-
ment effects of liberalization. It is worth noting that agglomeration economies in manufacturing
are similar in spirit, and could yield similar patterns (see, for example, Ellison and Glaeser (1997),
Rosenthal and Strange (2004), Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti (2010), and Kline and Moretti
(2014)). The important common element of the two mechanisms is that they can both generate
dynamics in local labor demand that persist for long periods of time following a one-time shock.
We focus our theoretical interpretation on sluggish factor adjustment because, as we discuss be-
low, evidence on the regional number of establishments, establishment entry and exit rates, and
job creation and destruction rates is supportive of the sluggish factor adjustment hypothesis, and
Dix-Carneiro (2014) shows that it can quantitatively explain the patterns we observe.
4.2 Empirical Approach
Following the model just described, we define the “regional tariff change,” or RTCr, as our empirical
measure of liberalization’s effect on local labor demand. This measure corresponds to the weighted-





βrid ln(1 + τi), (3)
where i indexes tradable goods industries. To calculate the βri, we measure λri as industry i’s initial
share of region r formal employment and ϕi as one minus the initial wage bill share of industry
value added in industry i.19 τi is the tariff rate in industry i, and d represents the long difference
from 1990-1995, the period of Brazilian trade liberalization.
Because Brazilian local labor markets differ substantially in the industry distribution of their
employment, the weights βri vary across regions. Figure 2 demonstrates how variation in industry
mix leads to variation in RTCr. The figure shows the initial industry distribution of employment
for the region with the most negative value, Colatina, the second largest city in Esṕırito Santo
state, and the most positive value, Paranatinga, in central Mato Grosso state. The industries on
the x-axis are sorted from the most negative to the most positive tariff change. Colatina has more
weight on the left side of the diagram, particularly in the apparel and food processing industries.
Paranatinga produces agricultural goods and wood products almost exclusively, both of which faced
more positive tariff changes. Thus, although all regions faced the same set of tariff changes across
19We calculate formal employment shares using the 1991 Census, as it provides a more detailed industry classifica-
tion than that available in RAIS. We initially use formal shares because of our focus on formal sector outcomes and
because workers can easily leave formal employment, but returning appears to be quite difficult (Dix-Carneiro 2014).
As we show in section 5.3, results are very similar when using overall employment shares, including both formal and
informal employment. We also use overall shares when studying outcomes outside the formal sector in Section 7.
The ϕi are calculated using IBGE national accounts data.
13
Trade Reform and Regional Dynamics Dix-Carneiro and Kovak
industries, variation in the industry distribution of employment in each region generates substantial
variation in RTCr. Appendix A.3 shows similar figures for a variety of other regions throughout
the country, showing how differences in industry mix drive geographic variation in RTCr.
This variation is presented in Figure 3. Regions facing larger tariff cuts are presented as darker
and bluer, while regions facing smaller cuts are shown as lighter and yellower. The region at the 10th
percentile faced a tariff decline of 13.8 percentage points, while the region at the 90th percentile
faced a 4.2 percentage point decline. Hence, in interpreting the regression estimates below, we
compare regions whose values of RTCr differ by 10 percentage points, closely approximating the
90-10 gap of 9.6 percentage points. Note that there is substantial variation in the tariff shocks even
among local labor markets within the same state. As we include state fixed effects in our analyses,
these within-state differences provide the identifying variation in our study.20
Note that our theoretical framework rationalizing the use of RTCr as a valid measure of trade-
induced local labor demand shocks assumes that workers are homogeneous, perfect substitutes in
production, and perfectly mobile across industries within regions. These assumptions limit our
ability to interpret heterogeneous effects of regional tariff changes on wages and employment of
workers with different skills and initially employed in different industries. Therefore, we refrain
from reporting heterogeneous effects of RTCr on the various labor market outcomes studied in this
paper and postpone such an investigation to future work extending our framework to accommodate
heterogeneous workers and complementarities in production.21
In the following two sections, we implement empirical analyses at the regional and individ-
ual levels. In both cases, we examine how post-liberalization (1995-2010) labor market outcomes
evolved for regions facing larger tariff cuts vs. regions facing smaller tariff cuts. Thus, we essentially
use a regional difference-in-differences approach with a continuous treatment given by RTCr. This
approach allows us to generate credible estimates of the causal regional effects of liberalization, but
cannot capture overall national effects of liberalization that apply across regions. This feature is
common to all studies utilizing cross-industry or cross-region variation for identifying the effects of
liberalization.
Our approach parallels prior studies examining the local effects of trade liberalization. However,
the RAIS data allow us to calculate changes in regional outcomes in each year following liberal-
ization, so rather than observe liberalization’s local effect in one post-shock period, we trace out
the dynamic regional response to liberalization as it evolves over time. We also include controls for
pre-liberalization trends that might otherwise confound this research design, with little effect on
the estimates. The following two sections describe our detailed estimation strategies and findings.
20A regression of RTCr on state fixed effects yields an R
2 of 0.23; i.e. 77% of the variation in RTCr is not explained
by state effects. Our main conclusions are unaffected by the inclusion or exclusion of state fixed effects.
21In this case, there will no longer be a unique local labor demand shock, but rather different local labor demand
shocks facing heterogeneous workers. Because of complementarities, a local labor demand shock to skilled workers
will also affect unskilled workers’ outcomes in such a way that local labor demand shocks across skill levels will all
be intertwined, as shown in Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015).
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5 Regional Analysis
5.1 Empirical Specification
Our regional analysis compares the evolution of outcomes in markets facing larger tariff cuts to
those in markets facing smaller cuts. For each year t following the beginning of liberalization (1992
to 2010), we estimate an equation of the following form:
yrt − yr,1991 = θtRTCr + αst + γt(yr,1990 − yr,1986) + εrt, (4)
where yrt is the value of a regional outcome such as earnings or employment, θt is the effect of
liberalization on outcomes by year t, αst are state fixed effects, and (yr,1990 − yr,1986) is a pre-
liberalization trend in the outcome variable. While the change in outcome varies with the year
t under consideration, the liberalization shock, RTCr, does not. Instead, it always reflects the
regional measure of tariff changes during liberalization, from 1990 to 1995.22 Using this strategy,
each year’s θt estimates one point on an impulse response function describing the local effects of
liberalization in each post-liberalization year.
We use 1991 as the base year for outcome changes to make results comparable between RAIS and
the Decennial Census. We include state fixed effects to account for any state-specific policies that
might commonly affect outcomes for all regions in the same state, such as state-specific minimum
wages, introduced in 2002 (Neri and Moura 2006). We include pre-liberalization trends in outcomes
(yr,1990− yr,1986) to address the possibility of confounding ongoing trends. For our main outcomes,
we present results with and without state fixed effects and pre-trends, with little effect on the
coefficients of interest. Since many of our dependent variables are themselves estimates, we weight
regressions based on the inverse of their standard error to account for heteroskedasticity. We
also cluster standard errors at the mesoregion level to account for potential spatial correlation in
outcomes across neighboring regions.
To consistently estimate θt, εrt must be uncorrelated with RTCr, conditional on the state fixed
effects and outcome pre-trend. For this identification assumption to be violated, there would need
to be an omitted variable that i) drives wage or employment growth across regions within a state
and ii) is correlated with RTCr but iii) is not captured by pre-liberalization outcome trends. While
such a feature is unlikely to exist, in Section 5.3 we confirm that our results are robust to a variety
of potential confounders and alternative specifications.
5.2 Regional Earnings and Employment
We begin by examining the local labor market effects of liberalization on formal sector earnings
and employment in each year following liberalization. Because hours information is not available
22Recall from Section 2 that tariffs declined between 1990 and 1995, after which they remained relatively stable.
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in RAIS before 1995, we focus on monthly earnings rather than hourly wages in the RAIS analysis.
We supplement these results with monthly earnings and hourly wages calculated using the Census.
First, we calculate regional earnings premia, adjusted for any compositional changes in the
regional workforce. For each year, we regress workers’ log December earnings on demographic
and educational controls, industry fixed effects, and region fixed effects. These regional fixed
effect coefficient estimates then reflect the earnings premium a worker receives in the relevant
region, beyond what would be expected given their other observable characteristics. By separately
estimating these regressions in each year, we allow for changes in the regional composition of workers
and changes in the returns to worker characteristics over time.23 This approach ensures that our
results are not driven by secular growth or decline of industries, changing discrimination, changes
in the returns to schooling, or any other changes in the returns to observable characteristics that
operate at the national level. Our dependent variable is then the change in log regional earnings
premium from 1991 to each subsequent year, 1992 to 2010.
Table 1 shows the results of estimating (4) for regional formal sector earnings and wages.
All estimates for the coefficient on RTCr are positive, indicating that regions facing larger tariff
declines experience relative earnings or wage declines. Consider Panel A, which presents earnings
estimates using the RAIS data. Columns (1) to (3) examine changes in earnings from 1991 to
2000, while columns (4) to (6) examine changes from 1991 to 2010. Columns (2) and (4) add state
fixed effects, and columns (3) and (6) add pre-trend controls for the change in the regional formal
earnings premium from 1986 to 1990. The coefficient estimate of 0.358 in column (3) indicates that
a region facing a 10 percentage point larger tariff decline (approximately the 90-10 gap in RTCr)
experienced a 3.58 percentage point larger proportional decline (smaller increase) in the regional
formal earnings premium.
A striking feature of Table 1 is the sharp increase in liberalization’s effect on earnings from
2000 to 2010. This indicates that the divergent earnings growth in regions facing different tariff
declines continued well beyond the liberalization period. Figure 4 confirms this pattern by plotting
the evolution of θt in (4). Each point on the figure corresponds to a regression coefficient like those
in Table 1, where the dependent variable is the change in earnings premium from 1991 to the year
listed on the x-axis. The vertical dashed line indicates that liberalization was complete in 1995. We
present coefficient estimates for 1992-94, but these should be interpreted with care, as liberalization
was still ongoing. However, the majority of the tariff cuts were implemented by 1993, so these early
coefficients are still informative regarding liberalization’s short run effects.24 The local earnings
effects of liberalization steadily grow for more than a decade, before leveling off in the late 2000s.
This increasing pattern is very robust to details of the specification, including trimming earn-
ings outliers, restricting the sample based on worker skill, focusing on tradable or nontradable
23Alternatively, we can control for constant, unobservable worker heterogeneity by pooling across years and including
individual fixed effects. As shown in Section 5.3, the results are very similar.
24When regressing RTCr on an alternate version measuring tariff changes from 1990-93, the R
2 is 0.93.
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sectors, and restricting the sample based on regional characteristics. Appendix Figure A5 shows
the underlying scatterplots, confirming our choice of linear estimating equation and showing that
the results are not driven by outliers. Panels B and C of Table 1 further confirm the increasing
pattern for formal earnings and formal hourly wages using the Decennial Census. We restrict the
Census sample to formally employed workers (those with a signed work card) for comparability with
RAIS. The similarity of the earnings and hourly wage results rules out the possibility of substantial
offsetting movement in hours, which are unavailable in RAIS. The negative coefficient estimates
on the pre-liberalization formal earnings trend controls suggests that, if anything, the growing ef-
fects that we see after liberalization represent a reversal of ongoing trends. Figure 5 confirms this
point by plotting coefficient estimates from regressing formal earnings growth from 1986 to each
pre-liberalization year on RTCr. It is clear that the growing effects after liberalization represent a
reversal of the existing trend.
Having seen that regions facing larger tariff declines experienced relatively deteriorating earnings
and wages, Table 2 examines liberalization’s effects on regional log formal employment in 2000 and
2010. As with earnings, the patterns are quite consistent across specifications, though the Census
point estimates are somewhat smaller.25 The estimate of 2.762 in Panel A column (3) shows that a
region facing a 10 percentage point larger tariff decline experienced a 31.8 percentage point larger
proportional decline (smaller increase) in formal employment from 1991 to 2000. Once again,
the effect grows substantially from 2000 to 2010, indicating that employment growth continued
to diverge for regions facing different regional tariff changes. The Census estimates in Panel B
similarly increase over time, and Figure 6 shows that the increase was quite steady for the first
decade following liberalization before leveling off in the mid 2000s. Figure 7 shows that there may
have been a very modest positive pre-liberalization trend in employment, but it is statistically
insignificant and of a far smaller scale than the large post-liberalization growth in Figure 6.
To better understand how regional employment adjusted to local liberalization shocks, Figure 8
separates overall employment into tradable sector and nontradable sector employment. The effects
of liberalization are clearly concentrated in the tradable sector, with large and increasing effects
on employment during and after liberalization. In the years just after liberalization, harder hit
regions experience small relative increases in nontradable sector employment, as the nontradable
sector absorbs a small share of the workers displaced from the tradable sector (we will confirm this
interpretation below using panel data). However, this reallocation is short-lived; a decade following
liberalization, the local nontradable sector has shrunk compared to that in more favorably affected
regions.
25The magnitude of the Census estimates should be viewed with caution. The employment questions changed from
a yearly definition in 1991 to a weekly definition in 2000, so changes in the level of employment are partly confounded
by this change in definition. However, since the definition change applied to all local labor markets, we are still able
to examine liberalization’s effect on employment by comparing outcomes across regions.
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5.3 Alternative Hypotheses and Robustness
The preceding subsection documented large regional effects of liberalization on formal earnings
and employment. The scale of these effects grew steadily for more than a decade, indicating that
outcomes continued to degrade in harder hit regions relative to more favorably affected regions for
many years following the end of liberalization. As discussed in Section 4.1, this pattern is consistent
with a model of regional labor markets with imperfect and slow adjustment of both labor and
complementary factors such as capital. Here, we rule out a number of alternative explanations for
the growing effects of liberalization to validate focusing on adjustment frictions and to demonstrate
the robustness of our findings.
The effects of liberalization could appear to grow over time because of correlated shocks occur-
ring after trade liberalization. To explain the smooth growth of the effects in Figures 4 and 6, such
shocks would need to affect industries or regions similarly to liberalization and would need to grow
steadily over time or occur quite regularly. Although these circumstances are unlikely, we construct
controls for a number of salient economic shocks in the post-liberalization period, demonstrating
that they are not driving our results.
If tariff changes after 1995 were correlated with those occurring during liberalization (1990-95),
they might drive apparently increasing effects of liberalization. We calculate post-liberalization
regional tariff changes as in (3), but use tariff changes between 1995 and year t > 1995 as ad-
ditional controls.26 Table 3 Panel A replicates the earnings analysis in columns (3) and (6) of
Table 1, including the post-liberalization tariff change up to year t, along with RTCr. The post-
liberalization control has the expected positive coefficient, but its inclusion has very little effect on
the liberalization coefficients.
Another possible explanation for the steadily increasing regional effects of liberalization is slow
adjustment in import or export markets. Although trade liberalization was implemented quickly
and was complete by 1995, it is possible that importers and exporters responded slowly to trade
policy changes, perhaps because of difficulty in forming trading links with firms abroad. If import
and export quantities responded slowly, it could explain the slowly evolving labor market effects
that we observe. To address this possibility, we follow Autor et al. (2013) (ADH) by constructing
changes in imports and exports per worker (in $100,000 units) for each industry and year, and then
form regional weighted averages analogous to (3).27 Figure 9 plots the coefficients from regressing
these ADH-style changes in imports and exports on regional tariff changes. If slow import and
export adjustment were driving the slow evolution of liberalization’s effect on regional earnings,
the export coefficients would exhibit a similar shape to the earnings coefficients in Figure 4, and/or
the import coefficients would exhibit their mirror image. This is clearly not the case; between 1995
26We construct post-liberalization tariff changes using tariff data from UNCTAD TRAINS, as the Kume et al.
(2003) tariff series ends in 1998.
27Imports and exports data are from Comtrade.
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and 2003, the response of earnings to RTCr increased by a factor of 11.6, while the ADH export
response stayed roughly constant, and the ADH import response declined. The import and export
coefficients grow only in the last few years of the sample, precisely when the earnings effects level
off, but the export standard errors also increase substantially during 2008-10, such that the point
estimates are not significantly different from zero. Table 3 Panel B confirms this point by directly
controlling for import and export growth, with minimal effect on the liberalization coefficients. Note
that these controls also rule out the potential confounding effects of the commodity price boom of
the 2000s (Costa et al. 2014) or correlated tariff cuts in Brazil’s export destinations (McCaig 2011).
Both of these phenomena would be reflected in a positive correlation with RTCr that grows over
time, yet we find no evidence of this pattern.
Other potential confounders are the Brazilian Real devaluations that occurred in 1999 and
2002. To the extent that industries were differentially affected by the exchange rate movements,
the depreciations could induce correlation with tariff changes across industries. We construct
industry-specific real exchange rates as trade-weighted averages of real exchange rates between
Brazil and its trading partners.28 We then take the change in log real exchange rate from 1990 to
year t for each industry, and calculate regional shocks using weighted averages as in (3). Panel C
includes this control in the earnings analysis, again with little effect on the scale or time pattern of
the liberalization coefficients. There was also a substantial wave of privatization during our sample
period. Beginning in 1995, the RAIS data allow us to identify as state-owned any firm at least
partly owned by the government.29 In Panel D of Table 3 we control for the change in the (regional)
share of workers employed in state owned firms between 1995 and year t, again with little effect on
the liberalization coefficients.
Along with these controls for post-liberalization shocks, we implemented a wide variety of ro-
bustness tests. Table 3 Panel E utilizes the panel nature of RAIS to account for unobservable
worker characteristics by controlling for worker fixed effects when estimating regional wage premia.
This approach is an alternative to our main specifications, which control for observable charac-
teristics and allow the returns to these characteristics to vary over time. As shown in Panel E,
both approaches yield similar results, indicating that our findings are not driven by workers sorting
on unobservable characteristics. Panel F controls for formal earnings pre-trends over the 1980-
1991 time period using Census data rather than the 1986-1990 pre-trends from RAIS in our main
specifications. The coefficients on RTCr are minimally affected.
Panels G and H examine changes in formal earnings premia in the manufacturing and nontrad-
able sectors, respectively. Each individual sector exhibits a very similar pattern to overall earnings
across sectors, supporting the assumptions of sectoral factor mobility and equilibrium adjustment
28Real exchange rates by country pair and year come from the Penn World Tables, while trade weights, measured
for 1990, are based on Comtrade data.
29The Brazilian privatization program started in 1991 with the administration of President Collor, but was signif-
icantly boosted during President Cardoso’s administration (1995-2002).
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of nontradable sector prices. Moreover, note that the manufacturing sector exhibits substantial ef-
fects immediately after liberalization, in 1995, while other sectors did not experience large positive
effects until later. This pattern suggests that liberalization’s effects were immediately incident upon
the manufacturing sector, and that the earnings effects only appeared in other sectors after workers
had time to move between sectors to arbitrage away earnings differences. Panels I and J restrict the
sample of regions to include those above median urban share and those above median formal share
of employment, respectively. In both cases, the sharply increasing pattern remains. The urban
restriction ensures that our results are not driven by the developments in genetically modified crop
technology studied by Bustos, Caprettini and Ponticelli (2013). As genetically modified crops were
outlawed in Brazil before 2003 and only permanently authorized in 2005, the timing of our effects
rules out this channel in any case.
Panel K uses an alternative version of the regional tariff change that is based on changes in
effective rates of protection rather than changes in nominal tariffs. These effective rates of protection
are calculated by Kume et al. (2003) based on Brazilian input-output relationships, accounting for
the effects of tariff changes on an industry’s inputs as well as its output.30 The increasing pattern
remains, but the point estimates are somewhat smaller than in the main specification, using regional
tariff changes based on nominal tariffs. However, this difference simply reflects the fact that the
scale of changes is larger for effective rates of protection; evaluated at the 90-10 difference in regional
tariff changes, both measures yield nearly identically sized effects. Panel L uses alternate values
for the regional employment weights λri in (3), including all workers – not just those in the formal
sector. Once again, the results are very similar to our baseline specifications, with steady increases
in liberalization’s effect on earnings.
The results in Table 3 demonstrate that the striking patterns we observe in liberalization’s
effects on regional earnings are robust to a variety of changes in specification and were not driven
by other major economic shocks during the post-liberalization period.31 Instead, it appears that
the regional labor market effects of liberalization genuinely grew for a decade after the tariff cuts
were complete, consistent with our model of slow factor adjustment.
5.4 Factor Adjustment
Having ruled out alternative hypotheses for the steady divergence in wage and employment growth
between regions facing more positive and more negative regional tariff changes, we more closely
consider the argument that the growing effects were driven by slow factor adjustment. Recall from
Section 4.1 that if labor adjusts quickly at first but other complementary factors such as capital
gradually adjust later, wage growth will steadily diverge in more positively and more negatively
30We do not control for output and input tariffs separately, as they are highly correlated at our level of industry
aggregation and would be strongly collinear.
31Unreported employment results are similarly robust.
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affected regions, precisely the pattern of effects in Figure 4.
Seen through this lens, we can explain more detailed features of Figure 4, following Dix-Carneiro
(2014) Section 7.4, which simulates a model of inter-industry reallocation with imperfect and slow
adjustment of labor and capital. On impact, wages in more negatively affected markets decline,
yielding a positive point estimate at the beginning of liberalization, in 1993. Some laborers reallo-
cate relatively quickly, partly equalizing outcomes across markets and lowering the measured effects
for a few years. Then, as specific factors begin reallocating away from more negatively affected
markets, workers’ marginal products and wages decline in those markets. Continued specific factor
reallocation amplifies those wage effects over the course of many years before leveling off after the
incentive for specific factors to reallocate has been exhausted.
Figure 6 shows direct evidence of slow labor adjustment. Formal employment fell in regions
facing more negative shocks relative to more positively affected regions. This adjustment occurred
quickly in the years following liberalization and then stopped around 2004, consistent with initially
rapid labor reallocation that tapered off by the mid 2000s. To measure regional capital adjustment
in response to trade liberalization, we examine changes in the number and size of formal establish-
ments in a given region. These measures are certain to be closely related to changes in regional
stocks of capital and other factors complementary with labor.32 Figure 10 Panel A shows liberal-
ization’s effects on the number of formal establishments, demonstrating that regions facing larger
tariff declines experienced larger contractions (smaller increases) in the number of local establish-
ments. This reallocation occurred slowly, with an increase in the early 2000s and leveling out later
in the sample period. Figure 10 Panel B shows that the decline in the number of establishments
in harder hit locations is not offset by growth in the average size of each firm, which is generally
unrelated to RTCr. This result supports the use of changes in the local number of establishments
as proxies for changes in local capital stocks.
We reinforce the idea that sluggish capital adjustment drove regional labor market dynamics
by studying how cumulative log job creation and log job destruction rates reacted to regional
tariff changes. We define job creation and job destruction as in Davis and Haltiwanger (1990),
measuring job growth and contraction starting from 1991 until each year in 1992-2010. Figure 11
shows that markets facing larger tariff declines experienced an immediate and persistent decline in
job creation rates relative to less affected local labor markets, suggesting a sharp relative decline
in investment rates in more affected local labor markets. In contrast, job destruction rates were
essentially unaffected through the late 1990s, after which they began to increase faster in relatively
32It is not possible to construct regional capital stocks in Brazil during our sample period. Manufacturing firm-
level capital stocks could in principle be constructed from the Annual Manufacturing Survey (PIA) in 1996 and later,
but establishment-level investment is not collected, making it impossible to regionally allocate capital for multi-
establishment firms. IBGE does not permit regional imputation in this case. Luis Carlos F. Pinto at IBGE, the
official in charge of clearing the use of PIA, confirmed that capital stocks cannot be constructed at the regional level.
Other data sources covering the remaining sectors of the Brazilian economy do not cover our sample period. The
Agricultural Census is available only in 1996 and 2006, and the Annual Service Survey (PAS) only started in 2002.
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depressed markets. Figure 12 examines establishment entry and exit rates, showing that the job
creation and destruction patterns in Figure 11 were driven largely by establishment entry and exit.
Markets facing larger tariff declines immediately exhibit lower entry rates following liberalization,
and this difference persists throughout the sample period. Just after liberalization, firm exit rates
are somewhat higher in regions facing larger tariff declines, but this effect grows steadily over time.
This observation is particularly supportive of the slow capital adjustment hypothesis, as the capital
stock associated with exiting establishments is very likely to depreciate or leave the region.
Together, these findings are consistent with the idea that slow factor adjustment accounts for the
persistent and growing labor market effects of trade liberalization. Both labor and capital appear
to adjust slowly, with relative declines in more negatively affected regions and relative increases
in more positively affected regions. While it is difficult to judge the precise relative timing and
speed of labor and capital reallocation, the results are consistent with the pattern of reallocation
needed to rationalize the observed labor market effects, and Dix-Carneiro (2014) has shown that
this mechanism can explain the quantitative size of the response as well.
5.5 Summary of Regional Analysis
In this section, we found large and growing regional effects of liberalization on formal sector earnings
and employment. Workers whose regions faced larger tariff declines experienced reductions in
earnings and employment compared to workers in more favorably affected regions, and these effects
grew steadily for more than a decade before leveling off in the late 2000s. These patterns were not
driven by pre-liberalization trends or post-liberalization economic shocks, and they are robust to
a wide variety of alternative specifications and sample restrictions. The dynamics in labor market
outcomes appear to reflect mutually reinforcing slow adjustment of labor and other complementary
factors such as capital, as evidenced by results on regional establishment counts and job creation
and destruction.
Our cross-regional research design identifies liberalization’s relative effects on regions facing
larger and smaller tariff declines, but cannot identify common effects at the national level. To
put our regional results in a national context, we present an alternative version of the earnings
and employment analysis. Table 4 breaks the 475 Brazilian microregions into quartiles based on
the value of each region’s regional tariff change (RTCr), with quartile 1 facing the largest tariff
declines and quartile 4 facing the most positive tariff changes. The top panel presents average log
real formal earnings levels for regions in each quartile, controlling for regional worker composition
as above. Earnings are deflated to 2010 Reais using the national consumer price index. Earnings
levels decline monotonically across quartiles, indicating that regions facing more negative shocks had
higher initial earnings. The middle panel reports the change in log real formal earnings following
1991. Brazil was growing quickly during our sample period, and real earnings grew in all four
quartiles. However, earnings and employment growth were much faster in regions facing more
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positive regional tariff changes and slower in regions facing more negative shocks, consistent with
our main results in Tables 1 and 2. Liberalization drove a convergence in earnings across regions
by accelerating earnings growth in low-earnings locations relative to those in high-earnings regions.
Thus, liberalization seems to have spurred growth in formerly marginal cities and towns as compared
to the country’s more traditional economic engines in large high-wage cities.
6 Individual Analysis
6.1 Empirical Specification
The RAIS data make it possible to follow individual workers over time, so we can observe the
medium- to long-run effects of liberalization on individual workers based on their initial region
of employment. Our main analysis focuses on a panel of workers who were initially employed in
the tradables sector in December 1989, just before trade liberalization began.33 Our population
of interest includes all workers aged 25-44 in December 1989 whose highest paying job was in the
tradable sector. For computational tractability, we take a 15% sample of individuals meeting these
criteria in regions with more than 2,000 tradable sector workers in 1989 and include all relevant
workers from smaller regions, weighting appropriately in subsequent analyses. This process yields
587,575 individuals in our main tradable sector sample. In Section 6.6, we also consider an alter-
nate population of workers initially employed in the nontradables sector, in order to investigate
the transmission of the trade shock into this sector. All other restrictions and sampling procedures
are the same, yielding a sample of 973,048 nontradable sector workers. Table 5 provides summary
statistics for the tradables sector and nontradables sector samples. Finally, we use alternate sam-
ples to study in-migration and the length of non-formal spells, described in Sections 6.2 and 6.5,
respectively.
The individual-level analysis estimates equations of the following form, separately for each year
in 1990-2009:
yijrt = αst + θtRTCr +Xijr,1989Φt + εijrt, (5)
where i indexes individuals, j is the worker’s initial industry of employment in December 1989, r is
the worker’s initial region of employment in December 1989, and t indexes years following the start
of liberalization (1990-2009).34 yijrt represents various worker-level post-liberalization outcomes,
which we define below. Xijr,1989 is a rich set of worker-level controls including demographics (9
education category indicators, age, age-squared), initial job characteristics for the highest-paying
job in December 1989 (84 occupation category indicators, 14 tradable industry indicators, 12 non-
33In the regional analysis above, we use 1991 as the base period to maintain comparability with the Census.
Regional results are unchanged when using 1989 as the base year.
34The 2010 RAIS data use a different individual identifier than the previous years, so we are only able to implement
the individual analysis through 2009.
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tradable industry indicators, tenure at the plant), initial employer characteristics (log employment,
exporting indicator, log exports, importing indicator, log imports), and initial region character-
istics (state indicators, pre-liberalization (1986-89) earnings and formal employment growth, a
control for the pre-liberalization (1986-89) level of each outcome of interest, and controls for other
pre-liberalization conditions related to the particular outcome).35 This specification compares sub-
sequent labor market outcomes for two otherwise observationally equivalent workers who in 1989
happened to live in regions facing different local trade shocks.
This analysis takes advantage of the panel dimension of the RAIS data and is similar in spirit
to the panel-data analysis in Autor et al. (forthcoming). However the studies differ in a number
of important ways. We i) focus on regional rather than industry shocks, ii) study a discrete shock
and hence focus our analysis on subsequent labor market dynamics, iii) study transitions into the
nontradable sector and informal employment, which are salient features of the Brazilian context,
and iv) study formal sector migration in response to regional shocks.
6.2 Employment
We begin by examining how the regional tariff change in a worker’s initial location affected their
subsequent formal employment status. We first calculate the average number of months formally






where Monthsis is the number of months individual i was formally employed in year s.
36
Figure 13 shows that the average number of months formally employed per year is lower for
workers whose initial regions faced a larger tariff decline. The effects increase steadily over time,
beginning just after liberalization was complete in 1995. This means that workers whose initial
regions faced larger tariff cuts worked fewer and fewer months of the year in the formal sector
compared to otherwise similar workers who started in more favorably affected regions. The 2009
35Firm-level imports and exports for 1990 come from customs data assembled by the Secretaria de Comércio
Exterior (SECEX). Region-specific formal earnings and employment growth between 1986 and 1989 are computed
as in Section 5. The pre-liberalization outcome controls are calculated as follows. We draw a sample of workers in
December 1986, paralleling the main sample, and estimate a version of (5) replacing RTCr with region indicators.
These first step region indicator coefficients enter as controls in equation (5). For example, when the outcome of
interest is given by equation (6), we first relate the average number of months formally employed per year between
January 1987 and December 1989 to region indicators. When the outcome of interest is given by equation (7), we
first relate the fraction of 1989 spent in the formal sector to region indicators. Note that for accumulated earnings, we
are unable to normalize by pre-1986 earnings, so we instead include the pre-liberalization control related to months
formally employed. For migration-related outcomes, we additionally include 1986-1991 out-migration probability
controls obtained from the Census.
36RAIS reports the month of accession and separation (if any) for each job, so that we can observe formal employ-
ment at the monthly level.
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point estimate is 6.0, implying that a worker whose initial region faced a 10 percentage point larger
tariff decline (approximately the 90-10 gap in RTCr) on average worked in the formal sector for
12 fewer total months between 1990 and 2009. This is a large effect, given that the unconditional
average number of total months worked in the formal sector during this time period for workers in
our sample is 120.
A closely related measure of liberalization’s effect on an individual’s formal employment expe-




This measure is similar to (6) but focuses on an individual year rather than the cumulative ex-
perience from 1990 onward. Figure 14 shows that workers whose initial regions faced larger tariff
cuts spent less of each year in formal employment, and that this effect grew for a decade following
liberalization before falling somewhat in the second half of the 2000s. The largest effect, 0.77,
appears in 2004. On average, a worker whose initial region faced a 10 percentage point larger tariff
decline spent 0.92 fewer months in formal employment compared to an average of 4.8 for the entire
sample in 2004.
Along with transitions out of formal employment, workers also adjust between tradable and
nontradable sector employment. Recall that all of the workers in our main sample were initially
employed in the tradable sector just prior to liberalization. We examine the average number of
months formally employed per year, as in (6), but separate months into those worked in tradable
and nontradable sector employment. Figure 15 shows that the overall formal employment response
is driven by changes in tradable sector employment. In fact, nontradable employment offsets a
fraction of the employment losses in the tradable sector, indicating that some tradable sector
workers facing larger regional tariff cuts transitioned into nontradable employment. However, the
relative increase in months of nontradable employment only offsets a small share of the losses in
tradable employment, such that overall months decline in the hardest hit locations, as seen in
Figure 13.
6.3 Mobility
Workers can also adjust by moving to a more favorable location. We investigate this phenomenon by
studying both out-migration and in-migration choices for formally employed workers. We begin with
out-migration, considering the probability that in year t a worker in our sample is formally employed
in a region other than their 1989 location. Figure 16 shows that there is no significant relationship
between the local tariff decline in a worker’s initial region and the subsequent probability of working
in a different region. Note that if migrants leave the formal sector, they leave the sample and their
migration will not be observed. To lessen potential bias due to differential attrition from formal
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employment, we calculate an alternate measure, the share of formally employed months spent away




This measure mitigates selection concerns because the vast majority of individuals in our sample
spend at least one month in the formal sector between 1990 and 2009. Figure 17 once again shows no
significant relationship. In fact, if anything, the positive point estimates suggest that more negative
local shocks lower the probability of obtaining formal employment outside the initial region.
To study in-migration, we construct separate samples of all formally employed individuals in
1989, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2009 using the same sampling rates described above. For each of these
samples, we record each worker’s location one year earlier, five years earlier, and in 1989, just before
liberalization began. We control for pre-existing migration patterns using three-year migration rates
from 1986-89 and other initial regional characteristics such as earnings and employment growth.
The results appear in Table 6. All point estimates are positive, indicating larger declines in in-
migration to harder hit regions. For example, the coefficient 0.317 in column (2) for 1995 indicates
that a region facing a 10 percentage point larger tariff decline experienced a 3.17 percentage point
larger decrease (smaller increase) in the share of in-migrants between 1990 and 1995. Longer time
frames permit larger migration responses, as indicated by decreasing magnitude coefficients moving
from left to right across columns and increasing coefficients moving down column (1), where 1989
is always the base year. These in-migration responses coupled with the lack of out-migration
responses are consistent with the relative contraction in formal employment in regions facing larger
tariff declines.
Note that these RAIS migration analyses can only capture migration events occurring for work-
ers who are formally employed both before and after migrating. We supplement these results by
examining changes in working-age population using the Census, which covers all individuals regard-
less of employment status.37 Columns (1) and (2) in Table 7 counterintuitively find that population
increased in harder-hit regions. However, this result disappears in all specifications that control
for pre-liberalization trends in population growth. Column (3) controls for 1980-1991 population
growth, while (4) controls for 1970-1980 population growth. Because the 1980-1991 pre-trend and
the dependent variable both contain the 1991 log population, in columns (5) and (6) we instrument
for the pre-trend using the 1980 population level and the 1970-1980 pre-trend, respectively. In all
cases with pre-trend controls, the population response is insignificantly different from zero, and in
columns (4)-(6), the point estimate is very small as well.
Thus, even though 11 percent of workers in the formal tradable sector in December 1989 are
observed with formal employment in a different region in 2000 (see Table 5), their out-migration
decisions are not influenced by local labor demand shocks. On the other hand, conditional on
37Note that we use a slightly aggregated region definition in Table 7. See Section 7 for details
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migrating, formal sector workers tend to avoid adversely affected regions. These findings parallel
those of two recent papers studying workers’ location choices in the United States during the Great
Recession. Yagan (2014) finds that out-migration does not respond to local labor demand shocks,
while Monras (2014) finds that in-migration declines in locations facing labor demand declines.
Interestingly, even though 5-year gross migration rates for working-age individuals are large (7.3%
between 1995 and 2000), net migration rates are not affected by the trade-induced local shocks.
Therefore, it seems that migrants keep moving to harder-hit locations, but they avoid the formal
sector in these locations. This pattern results in formal sector net migration (as measured by
RAIS) responding to the shocks, whereas overall net migration does not (as measured by Census
population). These findings imply that the substantial regional labor adjustment we documented
earlier occurred primarily through transitions between formal and informal employment rather than
through interregional migration.38 Recall that informal employment tends to be an absorbing state
in the Brazilian context, with very large barriers to shifting from informal to formal employment
(Dix-Carneiro 2014).
6.4 Earnings
Along with employment, we consider the effect of the regional trade shock in a worker’s initial
location on subsequent formal earnings. Keep in mind that formal earnings effects are likely to be
upper bounds on the overall earnings effects, as workers losing formal earnings may partially offset
these losses through earnings in the informal sector (which cannot be observed in RAIS). However,
we present these formal earnings results for completeness.
For each year t from 1990 to 2009, we calculate a worker’s average earnings from 1990 to t as












The numerator is the worker’s average post-liberalization earnings from 1990 to t, and the denom-
inator is the worker’s average pre-liberalization annualized formal sector earnings from 1986 to
1989. Note that formal earnings may decline due to lower wages or less time worked in the formal
sector. We use this measure because it accounts for worker heterogeneity in initial earnings while
still being well defined for workers with zero earnings after 1989, avoiding sample selection issues.
38Morten and Oliveira (2014) argue that road construction increased internal migration in Brazil by lowering
mobility costs. Such a policy response would be unlikely to increase the mobility response to liberalization, however,
because more positive regional tariff shocks tended to occur in traditional migration sending (low wage) locations
rather than receiving (high wage) locations.
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We then regress this earnings measure for each year t on the regional tariff change (RTCr) and the
extensive set of controls described above. Figure 18 shows the results. The point estimate in 2009
is 0.86, implying that over the course of 20 years a worker whose initial region faced a 10 percentage
point larger tariff decline lost 1.72 times their average pre-liberalization wage in the formal sector
in relative terms.





Rather than averaging over the sample period, this measure expresses earnings in each year. Once
again we see positive and growing coefficients following liberalization, indicating that earnings of
workers whose initial regions faced larger tariff declines steadily diverged from those initially in
more favorable regions for more than a decade following liberalization.
6.5 Non-Formal Spells
Above, we found that workers facing larger tariff declines spent more time out of formal employment.
We complement that analysis by examining the length of non-formal spells. To implement this
analysis, we need a representative sample of all job terminations that occur in a given region and
year. We draw a 5% sample of workers who appear in the RAIS data between 1986 and 2005. We
then record the length of all non-formal spells experienced by workers aged 25-55 and employed in
the tradable sector at the time the spell began. Since our data end at December 2009, non-formal
spells are right-censored at that point. We use a Tobit specification to relate the log non-formal
spell length to the regional tariff change in the worker’s region of formal employment when the
non-formal spell began and the full set of controls.39
The results are shown in Figure 20. Workers losing formal employment in regions that faced
larger tariff declines experienced relatively longer non-formal spells. The largest point estimate of
-4.57 appears in 1998, implying that among spells beginning in 1998, those in regions facing 10
percentage point larger tariff declines are 45.7% longer, on average.40
6.6 Nontradable Sector Workers
Recall that the earlier results in this section examine workers who initially worked in tradable goods
industries. We also implemented all of the above individual-level analyses using an alternate group
39To calculate the pre-liberalization trend control, we estimate a parallel specification for non-formal spells begin-
ning in 1986 and right-censoring spells extending beyond 1989, in order to avoid contaminating the pre-liberalization
non-formal spells with the effects of trade reform.
40For reference, the average non-formal spell length among those starting in 1998 and not truncated (finalized
before December 2009) is 21.4 months. The median length is 12 months.
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of workers who were initially employed in the nontradable sector. Our objective is to see whether
workers outside tradable sectors are insulated from the local effects trade liberalization, or whether
the tradable and nontradable labor markets are sufficiently integrated that regional trade shocks
affect both sectors’ workers similarly.
We find similar magnitudes and time patterns of effects for the tradable and nontradable sector
workers. Figure 21 analyzes the average months formally employed per year for the nontradable
workers. The pattern is very similar to that of the tradable workers (compare to Figure 13), with
effects that are about 20-25 percent smaller than those for tradable sector workers. Figure 22
analyzes average earnings. Once again, the results are similar to those for the tradable sector
workers (compare to Figure 18), with effects that are about 10-15 percent smaller. Thus, the two
portions of the labor market appear to be sufficiently integrated that the nontradable sector is only
slightly insulated from shocks in the tradable sector, on average.
The integration of nontradable and tradable sector labor markets is further reinforced by Fig-
ure 23, which breaks the employment analysis of Figure 21 into months spent in tradable and
nontradable employment. The results are quite different from those for tradable sector workers
in Figure 15. The biggest losses for workers initially in the nontradable sector occur in the trad-
able sector. Only in the last years of our sample do nontradable sector employment losses become
significantly different from zero, while tradable sector losses are large and significant throughout
the post-liberalization period. This means that nontradable sector workers regularly transition to
tradable employment, but that this adjustment margin is steadily curtailed in markets facing larger
tariff declines, driving much the employment losses faced by nontradable sector workers.
6.7 Summary of Individual Analysis
The preceding longitudinal analysis demonstrates that trade liberalization had large and long-
lasting effects on workers’ formal sector employment and earnings outcomes during the 15 years
following liberalization. Workers initially located in more adversely affected places experience large
relative losses that grow over time and never recover. Adversely affected workers spend less time
formally employed, experience relative declines in formal earnings, and experience longer spells
outside formal employment.
We also examine various adjustment margins within formal employment. Workers initially in the
tradable sector are more likely to transition into nontradable employment when facing more negative
shocks. However, these sectoral transitions are too small on average to compensate for losses in
the tradable sector. We find minimal effect of regional shocks on worker mobility, particularly
for formal out-migration and overall working-age population. However, those that did migrate
in the formal sector tended to avoid the hardest hit destinations, lowering in-migration rates of
formally-employed workers to those regions.
Finally, the evidence strongly supports the conclusion that formal tradable and nontradable
29
Trade Reform and Regional Dynamics Dix-Carneiro and Kovak
sectors are strongly integrated. Workers initially employed in the nontradable sector experienced
very similar employment and earnings effects to those initially employed in the tradable sector,
with only a slightly smaller magnitude. Employment losses for initially tradable sector workers
were partly offset by transitions into nontradable employment. More strikingly, employment losses
for initially nontradable sector workers occurred primarily through reduced subsequent transitions
into tradable employment, highlighting the close integration of the two sectors.
7 Informal Employment and Non-Employment
In the preceding analyses, we focus on outcomes for formally employed workers. The formal sector
is of particular interest for a variety of reasons. It is more capital intensive, dynamic, and productive
than the informal sector, and formal jobs are generally seen as being of much higher quality than
informal jobs (LaPorta and Schleifer 2008, Fajnzylber, Maloney and Montes-Rojas 2011, LaPorta
and Schleifer 2014). Formal employment gives workers access to all of the benefits and labor
protections afforded them by the legal employment system, while informal jobs generally provide
minimal benefits and fail to comply with various labor regulations. Hence, transitions out of formal
employment generally involve important declines in worker wellbeing even if displaced workers later
find informal employment. Finally, focusing on formal employment allows us to carefully observe
worker adjustment by taking advantage of the RAIS administrative panel data.
In this section we supplement the main formal sector results with additional analyses examin-
ing the roles of informal employment and non-employment in the regional labor market adjustment
patterns documented above.41 Trade policy’s effects on informality are also of independent inter-
est, as evidenced by a large and growing academic literature.42 Import competition may increase
pressure on firms to cut costs by failing to comply with labor regulations, and informal jobs are
often characterized as providing lower compensation, fewer opportunities for training and advance-
ment, and generally less favorable working conditions (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007, Bacchetta et
al. 2009). Together, these concerns have made informality a prominent issue in public debates over
globalization in the developing world (Bacchetta et al. 2009).
We examine informal employment and non-employment using the Decennial Census, which
covers all individuals, including those outside formal employment. Because the Census consists
of repeated cross-sections rather than panel data (as in RAIS), our conclusions in this section
will necessarily be somewhat more speculative than those for the formal sector. The 1991-2010
Censuses report whether a worker has a work card signed by her employer, which determines
41We focus on non-employment, which includes both unemployment and out of the labor force. This approach
allows us to avoid changing labor force definitions over time and captures transitions into unemployment and out of
the labor force, both of which may be affected by trade reform.
42See Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) and Paz (2014) for literature reviews with relevant citations.
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formal employment status.43 Table 8 reports the informal share of employment in each Census
year overall and by major sector. Informality increased during the 1990s from 58 percent to 64
percent before falling sharply during the 2000s to 49 percent in 2010. Informality rates vary widely
across sectors, with very high levels in agriculture and much lower levels for manufacturing and
for mining in the later periods. Informality rates fell steadily over time in agriculture and mining,
with particularly sharp declines in mining, while manufacturing and nontradable informality shares
followed the overall pattern of rising and then falling. This heterogeneity by sector will be important
in interpreting our subsequent results.
Because the Census only provides repeated cross sections rather than panel data, throughout
this section we use the regional estimation strategy introduced in Section 5. We construct pre-
liberalization trends using the 1980 and, when possible, 1970 Censuses. The 1970 Census contains
no information on formal vs. informal employment status, so we use 1970-1980 pre-trends only
when they are relevant. Since 1980-1991 pre-trends overlap with the dependent variables in 1991,
we instrument for them using the 1980 outcome level. We slightly aggregate regions to be consistent
from 1970 to 2010, yielding 411 consistently identifiable regions. As above, we cluster all standard
errors by mesoregion to account for potential spatial correlation in outcomes across neighboring
regions. Because we are now focusing on labor demand shocks faced by workers in both formal
and informal employment, we calculate regional tariff changes using regional industry employment
shares, λri, for all workers, as in Panel L of Table 3.
7.1 Informal and Non-Employment Shares
In both the regional and individual analyses presented above, it is clear that workers facing larger
tariff cuts spend less time in formal employment, but in the RAIS data we are unable to distinguish
between informal employment and non-employment. To address these adjustment margins, we use
Census data to examine the share of regional working age population that is informally employed
or non-employed. Following our wage analyses and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003), we calculate
regional employment shares controlling for worker composition.44 We regress indicators for informal
employment or non-employment on workers’ observable characteristics and region indicators, and
then use the change in the coefficients on those indicators as our dependent variable.
The results appear in Table 9. Panel A shows that regions facing larger tariff declines experience
relative increases in the share informally employed. The estimate of -0.171 in column (3) indicates
that by 2000 a region facing a 10 percentage point larger regional tariff decline exhibited a 1.71
percentage point larger increase in its informal employment share. Panel B shows that harder hit
regions experienced even larger increases in non-employment (including both unemployed and out of
43Since the 1980 Census does not include the work card question, when calculating pre-trends we utilize an alter-
native question on whether contributions were made to the worker’s public pension account. In 1991, the correlation
between this measure and the more accurate work card measure is 0.85.
44Results are similar for raw shares, unadjusted for worker composition.
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the labor force). By 2010, however, the situation is different. Informality shares increase even more
in harder hit locations, while the non-employment effect is now zero. In the absence of substantial
interregional migration, as documented above, these results imply that many workers whose regions
faced larger tariff declines were non-employed in the years following liberalization, but that many
of these individuals later found employment in the informal sector. Hence, transitions to informal
employment often occured following a lengthy spell of non-employment. Meghir, Narita and Robin
(forthcoming) support this interpretation, showing (in their Table 1) very frequent transitions of
unemployed workers to informal employment.45
This strong effect of liberalization on the local informal employment rate is a novel finding,
which may appear to contradict other results in the literature studying the response of Brazilian
informality to trade policy changes. The apparent conflict is resolved by noting differences in
methodology and margins of adjustment. For example, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) do not find
an effect of trade policy on informality, a finding corroborated by Bosch et al. (2012). These papers
examine changes in informality within manufacturing sectors, so their analyses omit changes in
informality within agriculture and mining. As shown in Table 8, during the 1990s, informal shares
increased in manufacturing industries, which faced larger tariff cuts, and informal shares declined
in agriculture and mining, which faced more positive tariff changes.46 Moreover, these studies
omit transitions to informal employment that occur after a spell of non-employment, which we just
found to be an important pattern in the Brazilian context. Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011)
examine yearly employment transitions for individual workers initially employed in manufacturing.
They find no significant relationship between tariff changes and the likelihood of transitioning
into informal employment but do find that output tariff declines lead to increased transitions
into non-employment. These findings are consistent with our results if, as suggested by Table 9,
many displaced formal sector workers spend a year or more in non-employment before eventually
obtaining informal employment. Therefore, the differences between our findings and those of prior
studies on Brazilian informality result from our inclusion of workers outside manufacturing and our
focus on medium- and long-run transitions, even if they involve a spell of non-employment. Our
findings more closely parallel those of McCaig and Pavcnik (2014), who find substantial shifts from
household (informal) to enterprise (formal) employment in Vietnam in response to the U.S.-Vietnam
Bilateral Trade Agreement.47
To complete the picture of regional labor market adjustment to liberalization-induced labor
demand shocks, we examine changes in the shares of regional employment falling in the following
four categories: formal tradable, formal nontradable, informal tradable, and informal nontradable,
45Transitions from unemployment to informal employment are 4 to 5 times more frequent than transitions from
unemployment to formal employment.
46Appendix Figure A6 provides a breakdown of informality changes by more detailed industry.
47Paz (2014) and Cruces, Porto and Viollaz (2014) provide two other recent examples that find significant effects
of tariff changes on informality using different methodologies.
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with results in Table 10.48 The results instrumenting for pre-trends in columns (4) and (8) are much
less stable than in other analyses, and in Panel D the instruments are very weak, so we focus on
columns (1)-(3) and (5)-(7). Formal tradable employment is clearly the category hardest hit when
facing negative regional tariff shocks. The offsetting growth in informal employment that we saw in
Table 9 occurs primarily in the tradable sector, while nontradables employment experiences much
smaller and insignificant effects. Putting these results in context, in Figure 15 we found that formal
tradable sector workers were more likely to transition into formal nontradable sector employment
when the initial region faced a more negative labor demand shock. Yet here we generally find
small positive or insignificant coefficients for the regional formal nontradable employment share,
indicating that this portion of the labor market does not expand to absorb the tradable sector
workers transitioning into nontradable employment. What, then, happened to nontradable sector
workers? Recall from Figure 23 that the biggest employment losses for workers initially in the
nontradable sector occurred in the tradable sector. This means that nontradable workers often
transition to tradable employment, but these transitions occur much less frequently in markets
facing larger tariff declines. It is likely that these nontradable sector workers who are no longer
able to find formal tradable or nontradable employment drive a large portion of the growth in
informal tradable employment seen in Table 10.
7.2 Wages
In Sections 5 and 6, we found compelling evidence that earnings and wages for formal sector workers
declined in regions facing larger tariff cuts, compared to regions facing smaller declines. In Table
11 we perform a similar analysis for informally employed workers and find quite different results. In
2000 there is no significant relationship between regional wages for informal workers and the regional
tariff change. This applies when controlling for 1980-1991 pre-trends, 1970-1980 pre-trends, or when
instrumenting the 1980-1991 pre-trend using the 1980 wage premium.49 The long-run results for
2010 are even more imprecisely estimated and vary substantially across specifications. These null
results are somewhat surprising – we expected informal wages to fall along with formal sector wages,
both because of declining local labor demand and because displaced formal sector workers flood
into informal employment. A potential explanation for the lack of effect on informal wages is that
consumers in harder hit regions experience declining incomes and shift toward lower-priced, lower
quality goods produced in the informal sector, offsetting wage declines for informally employed
workers.50
48Note that although these categories partition all employed workers, the coefficients do not precisely add to zero
because of differences in weighting and pre-trends across outcomes. Also, given the lack of information on formality
in the 1970 Census, we cannot calculate 1970-1980 pre-trends.
49We exclude specifications using the 1970-1980 pre-trends as instruments for the 1980-1991 pre-trends because the
instrument is very weak.
50Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2005) show that lower quality goods gain market share in recessions, while
McKenzie and Schargrodsky (2011) make a similar argument in the context of the 2002 economic crisis in Argentina.
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Other potential explanations are less plausible. First, following the logic of our model in Section
4.1, capital could be slowly reallocating from firms in the formal sector to firms in the informal
sector. This mechanism is unlikely, as firms in the informal sector are much less capital intensive
than firms in the formal sector (LaPorta and Schleifer 2008, Fajnzylber et al. 2011). Second,
displaced formal sector workers who move into informal employment may have more favorable
unobserved characteristics than average informal workers, even after controlling for education and
other demographics we use when calculating regional wage premia. This mechanism would predict
that overall wage effects mirror those for the formal sector, since compositional changes net out
when combining informal and formal employment. We show that this is not the case by examining
liberalization’s effects on overall wages for formal and informal workers together.
Table 12 shows the effects of regional tariff changes on overall wages for all workers irrespective
of formal status. In 2000, we find that wages for all workers fell more in regions facing larger tariff
declines. The coefficients are positive and significant in many specifications, consistent with the
formal sector results in Table 1. However, in contrast to the formal sector, there is little evidence of
growing wage effects by 2010. These effects are imprecisely estimated and vary substantially across
specifications. More generally, the findings for all workers in Table 12 make it clear that liberal-
ization had very different effects on the formal and informal sectors. These important differences
would be missed if one only examined overall wage effects without regard to formality.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined regional labor market dynamics following the Brazilian trade
liberalization of the early 1990s. Using matched employer-employee data as our primary data
source, we find large effects of trade liberalization on regional formal labor market outcomes such
as earnings and employment. Contrary to conventional wisdom, which assumes equalizing labor
adjustment, the regional effects of liberalization grow for more than a decade before leveling off.
This pattern is not driven by post-liberalization economic shocks and is robust to a wide variety
of alternative specifications. Rather, we argue that it is driven by mutually reinforcing, imperfect,
and slow adjustment of labor and complementary factors, driving dynamics in local labor demand.
We present a specific-factors model allowing for imperfect and slow factor adjustment, which yields
a theoretically consistent measure of liberalization’s effects on local labor demand and rationalizes
the labor market dynamics we observe. Dix-Carneiro (2014) shows that adjustment frictions across
industries in both labor and capital can lead to quantitatively similar effects to those we observe
While there is little direct evidence on the relative quality of goods produced by formal and informal firms, it is
well known that informal firms are significantly smaller than formal firms (LaPorta and Schleifer 2014, Meghir et
al. forthcoming, Ulyssea 2014), and Kugler and Verhoogen (2011) show that larger firms produce higher quality
goods than small firms, on average. Moreover, LaPorta and Schleifer (2008) show that informal firms use lower
quality inputs and speculate that they produce lower quality outputs as a result.
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across regions. We observe slow changes in regional employment, the regional number of firms,
establishment entry and exit rates, and job destruction rates that are consistent with the hypothesis
of slow adjustment of complementary factors.
We also study liberalization’s effects at the individual level by examining post-liberalization
outcomes for otherwise identical workers whose initial regions faced different regional tariff shocks.
We find that tradable sector workers whose initial regions faced larger tariff declines subsequently
spent less time in formal employment and that this effect grew steadily in the years following
liberalization. Tradable sector workers partly smoothed their formal sector outcomes by transi-
tioning into nontradable sector employment, but these transitions were too small on average to
fully compensate for losses in the tradable sector. On the other hand, nontradable sector workers
were largely driven into informal employment because they were no longer able to transition into
jobs in the shrinking local formal tradable job market. These transitions into informal employ-
ment occurred slowly over time and likely involved long periods of non-employment before workers
obtained informal employment.
Together, these results describe a rich pattern of dynamic regional adjustment to trade reform
in Brazil, in which favorably and unfavorably affected regions experienced very different trajectories
for labor market outcomes. It is important to keep in mind that our analysis is cross-sectional,
in that it does not identify common national effects of liberalization applying to all regions, but
rather identifies differential effects across regions. This feature is common to all papers exploring
variation in industry-specific or regional trade or liberalization shocks.
Our results have important implications for our thinking about the labor market effects of trade
liberalization. A growing literature has shown in a variety of contexts that trade and trade policy
have heterogeneous effects across regions in the short-run. However, most researchers, ourselves
included, generally assumed that these effects would be upper bounds on the long-run effects, as
labor reallocation would arbitrage away regional differences. This paper finds precisely the opposite.
Short-run effects vastly underestimate the long-run effects, indicating that the costs and benefits
of liberalization remain unevenly distributed across geography, even twenty years after the policy
began.
These novel empirical findings suggest new avenues for future work. We find evidence consistent
with the hypothesis that the growing effects of liberalization were driven by slow adjustment of
labor and complementary factors. These empirical results reinforce the message of Dix-Carneiro
(2014) that jointly quantifying mobility frictions for labor and capital is key to understanding trade
adjustment. Artuç, Bet, Brambilla and Porto (2014) take an initial step in this direction. We also
find large differences in local labor market effects in the formal and informal sectors, making clear
the importance of understanding how the two sectors interact in driving labor market outcomes,
and suggesting another avenue for future research. Finally, contrary to previous research on the
topic, we find that the informal sector acts as a fallback sector for workers in the aftermath of
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trade liberalization. It is therefore important to understand i) to what extent adversely affected
workers were able to smooth their labor market outcomes by transitioning to informal employment,
and ii) how labor market policies should respond to this margin of adjustment, if at all, given that
informal jobs are generally of lower quality and on average appear in less productive firms.
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1987-1998: Descrição e Avaliação,” in Carlos Henrique Corseuil and Honorio Kume, eds., A Abertura Comercial
Brasileira nos Anos 1990: Impactos Sobre Emprego e Salário, Rio de Janiero: MTE/IPEA, 2003, chapter 1,
pp. 1–37.
38
Trade Reform and Regional Dynamics Dix-Carneiro and Kovak
LaPorta, Rafael and Andrei Schleifer, “The Unofficial Economy and Economic Development,” Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, 2008, 47 (1), 123–135.
and , “Informality and Development,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 2014, 28 (3), 109–126.
Lopes de Melo, Rafael, “Firm Wage Differentials and Labor Market Sorting: Reconciling Theory and Evidence,”
unpublished, 2013.
MacKinnon, James G., “Thirty Years of Heteroskedasticity-Robust Inference,” Queen’s Economics Department
Working Paper, 2011, (1268).
McCaig, Brian, “Exporting Out of Poverty: Provincial Poverty in Vietnam and US Market Access,” Journal of
International Economics, 2011, 85 (1).
and Nina Pavcnik, “Export Markets and Labor Allocation in a Low-income Country,” NBER Working Paper,
2014, (20455).
McKenzie, David and Ernesto Schargrodsky, “Buying less, but shopping more: Changes in consumption
patterns during a crisis,” Economı́a, 2011, 11 (2), 1–35.
Meghir, Costas, Renata Narita, and Jean-Marc Robin, “Wages and Informality in Developing Countries,”
American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Menezes-Filho, Naercio and Marc-Andreas Muendler, “Labor Reallocation in Response to Trade Reform,”
NBER Working Paper, 2011, (17372).
Monras, Joan, “Economic Shocks and Internal Migration,” unpublished, 2014.
Morten, Melanie and Jaqueline Oliveira, “Migration, roads and labor market integration: Evidence from a
planned capital city,” unpublished, 2014.
Neri, Marcelo and Rodrigo Moura, “Brasil: La institucionalidad del salario mı́nimo,” in Andrés Marinakis and
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Tariff data from Kume et al. (2003), aggregated to allow consistent industry definitions across data sources. See
Appendix Table A1 for details of the industry classification.
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Industries sorted from most negative to most positive tariff change
Colatina, ES Paranatinga, MT
Industry distribution of 1991 employment in the two regions facing the most negative (Colatina, ES) and most positive
(Paranatinga, MT) regional tariff changes. Industries sorted by the tariff change, shown in Figure 1. More weight on
the left side of the figure leads to a more negative regional tariff change, and more weight on the right side leads to
a more positive regional tariff change.
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Local labor markets reflect microregions defined by IBGE, aggregated slightly to account for border changes between
1986 and 2010. Regions are colored based on the regional tariff change measure defined in (3). Dark lines represent
state borders, gray lines represent consistent microregion borders, and cross-hatched migroregions are omitted from
the analysis. These microregions were either i) part of a Free Trade Area ii) part of the state of Tocantins and not
consistently identifiable over time, or iii) not included in the sample before 1990.
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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Each point reflects an individual regression coefficient where the dependent variable is the change in regional log formal
earnings premium from 1991 to the year listed on the x-axis, calculated using RAIS. For all years, the independent
variable is the regional tariff change reflecting tariff changes from 1990-1995 (described in the text), with state fixed
effects and pre-trend control. Positive estimates imply larger earnings declines in regions facing larger tariff declines.
Vertical bar indicates that liberalization was complete in 1995. Dashed lines show 95 percent confidence intervals.
Standard errors adjusted for 112 mesoregion clusters.
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   2005	  
Each point reflects an individual regression coefficient where the dependent variable is the change in regional log formal
earnings premium from 1986 to the year listed on the x-axis, calculated using RAIS. For all years, the independent
variable is the regional tariff change reflecting tariff changes from 1990-1995 (described in the text), with state fixed
effects. Positive estimates imply larger earnings declines in regions facing larger tariff declines. Standard errors
adjusted for 112 mesoregion clusters.
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Each point reflects an individual regression coefficient where the dependent variable is the change in regional log
formal employment from 1991 to the year listed on the x-axis, calculated using RAIS. For all years, the independent
variable is the regional tariff change reflecting tariff changes from 1990-1995 (described in the text), with state fixed
effects and pre-trend control. Positive estimates imply larger formal employment declines in regions facing larger tariff
declines. Vertical bar indicates that liberalization was complete in 1995. Dashed lines show 95 percent confidence
intervals. Standard errors adjusted for 112 mesoregion clusters.
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Each point reflects an individual regression coefficient where the dependent variable is the change in regional log
formal employment from 1986 to the year listed on the x-axis, calculated using RAIS. For all years, the independent
variable is the regional tariff change reflecting tariff changes from 1990-1995 (described in the text), with state fixed
effects. Positive estimates imply larger formal employment declines in regions facing larger tariff declines. Standard
errors adjusted for 112 mesoregion clusters.
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   2010	  
Tradable	  
Nontradable	  
Each point reflects an individual regression coefficient where the dependent variable is the change in regional log formal
employment in the tradable or nontradable sector from 1991 to the year listed on the x-axis, calculated using RAIS.
For all years, the independent variable is the regional tariff change reflecting tariff changes from 1990-1995 (described
in the text), with state fixed effects and pre-trend control. Positive estimates imply larger formal employment declines
in the relevant sector in regions facing larger tariff declines. Vertical bar indicates that liberalization was complete
in 1995. Dashed lines show 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors adjusted for 112 mesoregion clusters.
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ADH	  Exports	  
ADH	  Imports	  
Each point reflects an individual regression coefficient where the dependent variable is change in regional imports per
worker, or change in regional exports per worker, calculated from 1991 to the year listed on the x-axis (see text for
details). For all years, the independent variable is the regional tariff change reflecting tariff changes from 1990-1995
(described in the text), with state fixed effects and pre-trend control. Positive (negative) estimates imply that regions
facing larger tariff declines experienced larger declines (increases) in regional exports per worker, or regional imports
per worker. Vertical bar indicates that liberalization was complete in 1995. Dashed lines show 95 percent confidence
intervals. Standard errors adjusted for 112 mesoregion clusters. Regional imports and exports per worker calculated
as in Autor et al. (2013)
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Figure 10: Capital Adjustment
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Each point reflects an individual regression coefficient where the dependent variable is the change in log number of
establishments or log average establishment size, calculated from 1991 to the year listed on the x-axis using RAIS.
For all years, the independent variable is the regional tariff change reflecting tariff changes from 1990-1995 (described
in the text), with state fixed effects and pre-trend control. Positive estimates imply larger declines in the number or
average size of formal establishments in regions facing larger tariff declines. Vertical bar indicates that liberalization
was complete in 1995. Dashed lines show 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors adjusted for 112 mesoregion
clusters.
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Job Destruction
Job Creation
Each point reflects an individual regression coefficient where the dependent variable is the log job creation or log
job destruction from 1991 to the year listed on the x-axis, calculated using RAIS. For all years, the independent
variable is the regional tariff change reflecting tariff changes from 1990-1995 (described in the text), with state fixed
effects and pre-trend control. Positive job creation estimates imply larger declines in cumulative job creation in regions
facing larger tariff declines. Negative job destruction estimates imply larger increases in cumulative job destruction in
regions facing larger tariff declines. Vertical bar indicates that liberalization was complete in 1995. Dashed lines show
95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors adjusted for 112 mesoregion clusters. Job creation and destruction
measured as in Davis and Haltiwanger (1990).
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Entry	  
Exit	  
Each point reflects an individual regression coefficient where the dependent variable is the rate of establishment entry
or exit from 1991 to the year listed on the x-axis, calculated using RAIS. For all years, the independent variable
is the regional tariff change reflecting tariff changes from 1990-1995 (described in the text), with state fixed effects
and pre-trend control. Positive entry estimates imply larger declines in firm entry rates in regions facing larger tariff
declines. Negative exit estimates imply larger increases in firm exit rates in regions facing larger tariff declines.
Vertical bar indicates that liberalization was complete in 1995. Dashed lines show 95 percent confidence intervals.
Standard errors adjusted for 112 mesoregion clusters.
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Each point reflects an individual regression coefficient where the dependent variable is the average number of months
formally employed per year from 1990 to the year listed on the x-axis, calculated using RAIS. For all years, the
independent variable is the regional tariff change reflecting tariff changes from 1990-1995 (described in the text), with
various controls (described in the text). Positive estimates imply fewer average months formally employed for workers
initially employed in regions facing larger tariff declines. Vertical bar indicates that liberalization was complete in
1995. Dashed lines show 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors adjusted for 112 mesoregion clusters.
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Each point reflects an individual regression coefficient where the dependent variable is the fraction of the year spent
in formal employment for the year listed on the x-axis, calculated using RAIS. For all years, the independent variable
is the regional tariff change reflecting tariff changes from 1990-1995 (described in the text), with various controls
(described in the text). Positive estimates imply smaller fractions of the year in formal employment for workers
initially employed in regions facing larger tariff declines. Vertical bar indicates that liberalization was complete in
1995. Dashed lines show 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors adjusted for 112 mesoregion clusters.
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Nontradable	  
Tradable	  
Each point reflects an individual regression coefficient where the dependent variable is the average number of months
per year formally employed in the tradable or nontradable sector from 1990 to the year listed on the x-axis, calculated
using RAIS. For all years, the independent variable is the regional tariff change reflecting tariff changes from 1990-1995
(described in the text), with various controls (described in the text). Positive (negative) estimates imply fewer (more)
average months formally employed in the relevant sector for workers initially employed in regions facing larger tariff
declines. Vertical bar indicates that liberalization was complete in 1995. Dashed lines show 95 percent confidence
intervals. Standard errors adjusted for 112 mesoregion clusters.
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Figure 16: Individual Probability of Formal Employment Away from the Worker’s Initial Region -
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Each point reflects an individual regression coefficient where the dependent variable is an indicator for being observed
in a different region in the year listed on the x-axis than in 1989, when the sample was drawn, calculated using RAIS.
For all years, the independent variable is the regional tariff change reflecting tariff changes from 1990-1995 (described
in the text), with various controls (described in the text). Positive estimates imply a lower probability of being
employed away from the initial region for workers initially employed in regions facing larger tariff declines. Vertical
bar indicates that liberalization was complete in 1995. Dashed lines show 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard
errors adjusted for 112 mesoregion clusters.
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Figure 17: Individual Share of Formally Employed Months Away from Initial Region - Tradable
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Each point reflects an individual regression coefficient where the dependent variable is the share of formally employed
months in the year listed on the x-axis that the individual spent working in a region other than their initial region,
calculated using RAIS. For all years, the independent variable is the regional tariff change reflecting tariff changes
from 1990-1995 (described in the text), with various controls (described in the text). Positive estimates imply a
lower share of formally employed months away from the initial region for workers initially employed in regions facing
larger tariff declines. Vertical bar indicates that liberalization was complete in 1995. Dashed lines show 95 percent
confidence intervals. Standard errors adjusted for 112 mesoregion clusters.
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Each point reflects an individual regression coefficient where the dependent variable is the average earnings from 1990
to the year listed on the x-axis as a multiple of the worker’s average pre-liberalization (1986-89) earnings, calculated
using RAIS. For all years, the independent variable is the regional tariff change reflecting tariff changes from 1990-
1995 (described in the text), with various controls (described in the text). Positive estimates imply larger declines in
average formal earnings for workers initially employed in regions facing larger tariff declines. Vertical bar indicates
that liberalization was complete in 1995. Dashed lines show 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors adjusted
for 112 mesoregion clusters.
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Each point reflects an individual regression coefficient where the dependent variable is the yearly earnings in the
year listed on the x-axis as a multiple of the worker’s average pre-liberalization (1986-89) earnings, calculated using
RAIS. For all years, the independent variable is the regional tariff change reflecting tariff changes from 1990-1995
(described in the text), with various controls (described in the text). Positive estimates imply larger declines in
yearly formal earnings for workers initially employed in regions facing larger tariff declines. Vertical bar indicates
that liberalization was complete in 1995. Dashed lines show 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors adjusted
for 112 mesoregion clusters.
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Each point reflects an individual Tobit regression coefficient where observations represent individual spells, and the
dependent variable is the log spell length in years, calculated using RAIS. For all years, the independent variable
is the regional tariff change reflecting tariff changes from 1990-1995 (described in the text) in the worker’s region
at the beginning of the nonformal spell, with various worker-level controls and pre-trend control (described in the
text). Negative estimates imply longer non-formal spell lengths for workers losing formal employment in regions
facing larger tariff declines. Vertical bar indicates that liberalization was complete in 1995. Dashed lines show 95
percent confidence intervals. Standard errors adjusted for 112 mesoregion clusters.
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Each point reflects an individual regression coefficient where the dependent variable is the average number of months
formally employed per year from 1990 to the year listed on the x-axis, calculated using RAIS. For all years, the
independent variable is the regional tariff change reflecting tariff changes from 1990-1995 (described in the text), with
various controls (described in the text). Positive estimates imply fewer average months formally employed for workers
initially employed in regions facing larger tariff declines. Vertical bar indicates that liberalization was complete in
1995. Dashed lines show 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors adjusted for 112 mesoregion clusters.
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Each point reflects an individual regression coefficient where the dependent variable is the average earnings from 1990
to the year listed on the x-axis as a multiple of the worker’s average pre-liberalization (1986-89) earnings, calculated
using RAIS. For all years, the independent variable is the regional tariff change reflecting tariff changes from 1990-
1995 (described in the text), with various controls (described in the text). Positive estimates imply larger declines in
average formal earnings for workers initially employed in regions facing larger tariff declines. Vertical bar indicates
that liberalization was complete in 1995. Dashed lines show 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors adjusted
for 112 mesoregion clusters.
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Tradable
Non-Tradable
Each point reflects an individual regression coefficient where the dependent variable is the average number of months
formally employed in the relevant sector per year from 1990 to the year listed on the x-axis, calculated using RAIS.
For all years, the independent variable is the regional tariff change reflecting tariff changes from 1990-1995 (described
in the text), with various controls (described in the text). Positive (negative) estimates imply fewer (more) average
months formally employed in the relevant sector for workers initially employed in regions facing larger tariff declines.
Vertical bar indicates that liberalization was complete in 1995. Dashed lines show 95 percent confidence intervals.
Standard errors adjusted for 112 mesoregion clusters.
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Table 1: Regional log Formal Earnings Premia - 2000, 2010
Change	  in	  log	  formal	  earnings	  premium:	  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel	  A:	  RAIS
Regional	  tariff	  change 	  0.472* 	  0.536** 	  0.358 	  1.891*** 	  1.898*** 	  1.665***
(0.256) (0.237) (0.217) (0.478) (0.327) (0.298)
Formal	  earnings	  pre-­‐trend	  (86-­‐90) -­‐0.344** -­‐0.467***
(0.150) (0.144)
State	  fixed	  effects	  (26) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R-­‐squared 0.019 0.183 0.236 0.142 0.409 0.454
Panel	  B:	  Census	  Earnings
Regional	  tariff	  change 	  0.379 	  0.399** 	  0.353* 	  1.342* 	  1.178*** 	  1.126***
(0.459) (0.198) (0.195) (0.735) (0.292) (0.273)
Formal	  earnings	  pre-­‐trend	  (86-­‐90) -­‐0.098* -­‐0.113
(0.054) (0.075)
State	  fixed	  effects	  (26) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R-­‐squared 0.013 0.583 0.587 0.071 0.707 0.710
Panel	  C:	  Census	  Hourly	  Wages
Regional	  tariff	  change 	  0.584 	  0.631*** 	  0.572*** 	  1.229* 	  0.957*** 	  0.894***
(0.477) (0.199) (0.191) (0.670) (0.257) (0.241)
Formal	  earnings	  pre-­‐trend	  (86-­‐90) -­‐0.126** -­‐0.139**
(0.056) (0.066)
State	  fixed	  effects	  (26) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R-­‐squared 0.029 0.595 0.601 0.057 0.704 0.708
1991-­‐2000 1991-­‐2010
Positive coefficient estimates for the regional tariff change imply larger declines in formal earnings/wages in regions
facing larger tariff declines. 475 microregion observations. Standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted for 112 mesore-
gion clusters. Weighted by the inverse of the squared standard error of the estimated change in log formal earnings
or wage premium. Pre-trends computed for 1986-1990 period. *** Significant at the 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10
percent level.
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Table 2: Regional log Formal Employment - 2000, 2010
Change	  in	  log	  formal	  employment:	  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel	  A:	  RAIS
Regional	  tariff	  change 	  2.934*** 2.659*** 	  2.762*** 	  4.983*** 	  4.326*** 	  4.380***
(0.842) (0.825) (0.760) (0.866) (0.812) (0.795)
Formal	  employment	  pre-­‐trend	  (86-­‐90) -­‐0.413** -­‐0.216
(0.199) (0.187)
State	  fixed	  effects	  (26) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R-­‐squared 0.035 0.273 0.300 0.081 0.400 0.405
Panel	  B:	  Census
Regional	  tariff	  change 	  2.319** 	  1.667*** 	  1.430*** 	  3.330** 	  2.340*** 	  2.074**
(0.939) (0.563) (0.537) (1.424) (0.886) (0.863)
Formal	  employment	  pre-­‐trend	  (86-­‐90) 	  0.224*** 	  0.262***
(0.071) (0.099)
State	  fixed	  effects	  (26) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R-­‐squared 0.113 0.542 0.563 0.097 0.555 0.568
1991-­‐2000 1991-­‐2010
Positive coefficient estimates for the regional tariff change imply larger declines in formal employment in regions facing
larger tariff declines. 475 microregion observations. Standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted for 112 mesoregion
clusters. Census results weighted by the inverse of the squared standard error of the estimated change in log formal
employment. Pre-trends computed for 1986-1990 period. *** Significant at the 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
level.
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Table 3: Robustness: Regional log Formal Earnings Premia - 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010
Change in log formal earnings premium: 1991-1995 1991-2000 1991-2005 1991-2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Post-liberalization tariff changes
Regional tariff change 0.089 0.319 0.970*** 1.847***
(0.189) (0.224) (0.299) (0.304)
Post-liberalization tariff change n/a 2.305  10.451** 1.708
(2.921) (4.284) (1.042)
Panel B: Imports and exports (ADH)
Regional tariff change 0.083 0.363 1.183*** 1.542***
(0.193) (0.253) (0.319) (0.386)
Imports (ADH) 0.003 -0.459** -0.181 -0.127
(0.124) (0.231) (0.493) (0.186)
Exports (ADH) -0.359 1.986 -0.128 -0.051
(0.950) (1.219) (0.375) (0.067)
Panel C: Real exchange rate
Regional tariff change 0.133 0.358 1.244*** 1.674***
(0.190) (0.227) (0.313) (0.293)
Real exchange rate change - trade weighted -0.226 -0.001 -0.092 0.832**
(0.304) (0.362) (0.590) (0.415)
Panel D: Privatization
Regional tariff change 0.089 0.328 1.187*** 1.585***
(0.189) (0.218) (0.243) (0.303)
Change in state-owned share of empl. n/a 0.1785 0.4509** 0.3504
(0.181) (0.223) (0.234)
Panel E: Individual Fixed Effects
Regional tariff change 0.175 0.265 1.011*** 1.201***
(0.174) (0.199) (0.211) (0.254)
Panel F: 1980-1991 Census Pre-Trends
Regional tariff change 0.315 0.500* 1.364*** 1.832***
(0.207) (0.260) (0.281) (0.361)
Panel G: Manufacturing Sector Earnings
Regional tariff change 0.626** 0.630** 1.700*** 2.160***
(0.262) (0.316) (0.379) (0.462)
Panel H: Nontradable Sector Earnings
Regional tariff change 0.078 0.284 1.221*** 1.637***
(0.238) (0.259) (0.268) (0.299)
Panel I: Sample restriction - above median urban share - 238 obs
Regional tariff change  0.072  0.272  1.297***  1.939***
(0.205) (0.232) (0.277) (0.343)
Panel J: Sample restriction - above median formal share - 238 obs
Regional tariff change  0.182  0.412*  1.417***  1.907***
(0.205) (0.223) (0.244) (0.311)
Panel K: Alternate tariff measure - effective rate of protection (ERP)
Regional ERP change  0.009  0.165  0.669***  0.886***
(0.106) (0.133) (0.151) (0.178)
Panel L: Alternate RTC measure - employment shares including formal and informal labor
Alternate regional tariff change -0.000  0.483***  1.367***  1.833***
(0.150) (0.167) (0.167) (0.215)
Formal earnings pre-trend (86-90) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
State fixed effects (26) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Positive coefficient estimates for the regional tariff change imply larger declines in formal earnings in regions facing
larger tariff declines. 475 microregion observations, unless otherwise noted. Outcomes calculated using RAIS data.
Standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted for 112 mesoregion clusters. Weighted by the inverse of the squared standard
error of the estimated change in log formal earnings premium. Pre-trends computed for 1986-1990 period, unless
otherwise noted. *** Significant at the 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent level.
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Table 4: Evolution of Formal Earnings and Employment by RTC Quartile
Regional Tariff Change quartile: 1 2 3 4
most negative most positive
1991 log real formal earnings level 5.79 5.60 5.53 5.44
change in log real formal earnings
1991-1995 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.25
1991-2000 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.29
1991-2005 0.23 0.29 0.34 0.38
1991-2010 0.49 0.59 0.64 0.68
change in log formal employment
1991-1995 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.11
1991-2000 0.10 0.16 0.20 0.23
1991-2005 0.19 0.30 0.34 0.37
1991-2010 0.32 0.43 0.47 0.49
Formal earnings and employment from RAIS data. Regional Tariff Changes calculated based on equation 3. See
text for details. 475 microregion observations. Earnings deflated using the national consumer price index. Regional
earnings calculated as average regional residuals after controlling for regional worker composition with demographic
characteristics and industry fixed effects.
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Table 5: Individual Analysis Summary Statsitics
mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
Education
Illiterate 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.11
4th grade incomplete 0.13 0.33 0.10 0.30
4th grade complete 0.25 0.43 0.18 0.38
8th grade incomplete 0.19 0.39 0.14 0.34
8th grade complete 0.15 0.35 0.14 0.35
High School incomplete 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.24
High School complete 0.13 0.33 0.21 0.40
College incomplete 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.19
College complete 0.07 0.26 0.12 0.33
Female 0.24 0.43 0.32 0.46
Age 32.8 5.4 32.8 5.5
December 1989 Earnings (in 2010 R$) 1,911 2,459 1,838 2,670
1989 Yearly Earnings (in 2010 R$) 19,172 23,750 18,701 26,087
Average Annualized Earnings 1986-1989 (in 2010 R$) 19,010 21,043 18,077 21,653
Months formally employed per year
1990 10.2 3.4 9.9 3.8
1990-1995 8.2 3.8 8.2 3.9
1990-2000 7.1 3.7 7.2 3.9
1990-2005 6.4 3.7 6.6 3.9
1990-2009 6.0 3.7 6.2 3.9
Employed in a different region in 1994 than in 1989 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.31
Employed in a different region in 2000 than in 1989 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.32
Observations
Tradable Sector Sample Nontradable Sector Sample
587,575 973,048
RAIS data. Weighted to account for 15% sample of individuals in regions with more than 2000 traded sector workers
in 1989 and 100% sample in other regions. All monetary values reported in 2010 R$. In Dec 31, 2010, a US dollar
was worth 1.66 Brazilian Reais.
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Table 6: Individual Probability of In-Migration, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2009
(1) (2) (3)
In-Migration Indicator: 1989 to t t-5 to t t-1 to t
Panel A: 1995 sample
    Regional tariff change 0.633 0.317** 0.476
(0.393) (0.157) (0.335)
    Observations 529,940 532,384 613,067
    R-squared 0.098 0.094 0.047
Panel B: 2000 Sample
    Regional tariff change 0.637*** 0.364** 0.150**
(0.179) (0.176) (0.075)
    Observations 399,197 437,615 517,185
    R-squared 0.126 0.106 0.050
Panel C: 2005 Sample
    Regional tariff change 0.997*** 0.488*** 0.170***
(0.171) (0.149) (0.039)
    Observations 351,495 387,428 478,112
    R-squared 0.128 0.092 0.049
Panel D: 2009 Sample
    Regional tariff change 1.082*** 0.268** 0.124***
(0.158) (0.104) (0.034)
    Observations 320,840 387,620 460,446
    R-squared 0.125 0.090 0.054
Individual-level panel data from RAIS. Each panel represents a separate sample of individuals present in RAIS in the
year listed. The dependent variable varies by column. In column (1) it is an indicator for having lived in a different
region in 1989 than in the reference year listed in the panel title. In columns (2) and (3) is is an indicator for having
lived in a different region five years or one year before the reference year, respectively. Positive coefficient estimates for
the regional tariff change imply larger declines in in-migration to regions facing larger tariff declines. All specifications
include controls for 1986-89 in-migration probability premia after controlling for individual characteristics. Standard
errors adjusted for 112 mesoregion clusters. *** Significant at the 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent level.
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Table 7: Regional log Working-Age Population
Change in log working-age population: 
1980 pop. 70-80 Δpop.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Census - 1991-2000
Regional tariff change -0.176 -0.835*** -0.331  0.055 -0.022 -0.085
(0.276) (0.159) (0.243) (0.330) (0.092) (0.166)
Population pre-trend (80-91) 0.407**  0.656***  0.605***
(0.164) (0.038) (0.106)
Population pre-trend (70-80)  0.295***
(0.073)
State fixed effects (26) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R-squared 0.009 0.399 0.657 0.557
First stage partial F-Statistic 212.6 32.31
Panel B: Census - 1991-2010
Regional tariff change -0.174 -1.175*** -0.389  0.162  0.078 -0.030
(0.432) (0.285) (0.320) (0.474) (0.163) (0.233)
Population pre-trend (80-91) 0.634***  1.010***  0.923***
(0.225) (0.059) (0.147)
Population pre-trend (70-80)  0.441***
(0.087)
State fixed effects (26) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R-squared 0.003 0.422 0.669 0.554
First stage partial F-Statistic 197.9 31.54
OLS IV
Decennial Census data. Positive (negative) coefficient estimates for the regional tariff change imply larger decreases
(increases) in working-age population in regions facing larger tariff declines. 411 microregion observations. Standard
errors (in parentheses) adjusted for 112 mesoregion clusters. Weighted by the inverse of the squared standard error of
the estimated change in the relevant employment share. Pre-trends computed for 1980-1991 and 1970-1980 periods.
To address potential endogeneity of 1980-1991 pre-trend due to overlap with dependent variable in 1991, 1980-1991
pre-trends are instrumented using the 1980 population level in column (5) and the 1970-1980 trend in column (6).
First-stage partial F-statistics reported for instrumental variables specifications. *** Significant at the 1 percent, **
5 percent, * 10 percent level.
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Table 8: Informal Share of Employment
1991 2000 2010
Overall 0.58 0.64 0.49
Agriculture 0.89 0.86 0.83
Mining 0.61 0.45 0.21
Manufacturing 0.28 0.39 0.29
Nontradable 0.55 0.64 0.48
Decennial Census data.
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Table 10: Formal/Informal x Tradable/Nontradable Share of Regional Employment - 2000, 2010
Change in share of employment IV IV
1980 share 1980 share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Formal tradable share
Regional tariff change  0.461***  0.433***  0.386***  0.162***  0.521***  0.560***  0.452***  0.205**
(0.082) (0.044) (0.040) (0.051) (0.117) (0.077) (0.051) (0.085)
Dependent var. pre-trend (80-91)  0.180*  1.033***  0.396***  1.302***
(0.099) (0.163) (0.145) (0.205)
State fixed effects (26) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R-squared 0.454 0.683 0.698 0.303 0.575 0.620
First stage partial F-Statistic 32.81 30.36
Panel B: Formal nontradable share
Regional tariff change  0.009  0.121***  0.070 -0.158*** -0.057  0.113*  0.102 -0.080
(0.041) (0.042) (0.060) (0.044) (0.053) (0.063) (0.094) (0.084)
Dependent var. pre-trend (80-91)  0.105  0.579***  0.022  0.401***
(0.075) (0.073) (0.115) (0.118)
State fixed effects (26) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R-squared 0.000 0.376 0.390 0.006 0.590 0.590
First stage partial F-Statistic 166.1 178.9
Panel C: Informal tradable share
Regional tariff change -0.622*** -0.571*** -0.627*** -0.101 -0.803*** -0.771*** -0.825***  0.041
(0.053) (0.044) (0.051) (0.206) (0.079) (0.078) (0.096) (0.277)
Dependent var. pre-trend (80-91) -0.069*  0.573** -0.065  0.981***
(0.042) (0.244) -0.058 (0.320)
State fixed effects (26) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R-squared 0.535 0.704 0.708 0.486 0.682 0.684
First stage partial F-Statistic 15.08 16.01
Panel D: Informal nontradable share
Regional tariff change  0.011 -0.045 -0.060 -0.440**  0.073 -0.023 -0.135* -0.879**
(0.052) (0.047) (0.048) (0.224) (0.103) (0.073) (0.073) (0.368)
Dependent var. pre-trend (80-91) -0.076 -1.969* -0.542*** -4.142**
(0.090) (1.059) (0.086) (1.722)
State fixed effects (26) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R-squared 0.000 0.329 0.332 0.008 0.454 0.534
First stage partial F-Statistic 4.351 4.985
2000 2010
OLS OLS
Decennial Census data. Positive (negative) coefficient estimates for the regional tariff change imply larger decreases
(increases) in the relevant share in regions facing larger tariff declines. 411 microregion observations. Standard
errors (in parentheses) adjusted for 112 mesoregion clusters. Weighted by the inverse of the squared standard error
of the estimated change in the relevant employment share. Pre-trends computed for 1980-1991 period. To address
endogeneity of pre-trend due to overlap with dependent variable in 1991, pre-trends are instrumented using the
corresponding 1980 employment category share. First-stage partial F-statistics reported for instrumental variables
specifications. *** Significant at the 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent level.
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Table 11: Regional log Wage Premia - Informal Workers - 2000, 2010
Change in log wage premium: IV
1980 earn
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Census - 1991-2000
Regional tariff change  0.010  0.264 -0.000  0.250  0.442
(0.408) (0.167) (0.158) (0.163) (0.313)
Earnings pre-trend (80-91) -0.235***  0.159
(0.055) (0.198)
Earnings pre-trend, all workers (70-80)  0.020
(0.071)
State fixed effects (26) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R-squared 0.000 0.646 0.676 0.646
First stage partial F-Statistic 24.82
Panel B: Census - 1991-2010
Regional tariff change -0.312 -0.334 -0.769*** -0.322  0.057
(0.590) (0.329) (0.261) (0.324) (0.508)
Earnings pre-trend (80-91) -0.380***  0.341
(0.081) (0.219)
Earnings pre-trend, all workers (70-80) -0.019
(0.101)
State fixed effects (26) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R-squared 0.007 0.636 0.680 0.636
First stage partial F-Statistic 27.19
OLS
Decennial Census data. Positive (negative) coefficient estimates for the regional tariff change imply larger declines
(increases) in informal workers’ wages in regions facing larger tariff declines. 411 microregion observations. Standard
errors (in parentheses) adjusted for 112 mesoregion clusters. Weighted by the inverse of the squared standard error
of the estimated change in the relevant regional wage premium share. Due to a lack of hours information in 1980,
pre-trends for earnings computed for 1980-1991 and 1970-1980 periods. To address potential endogeneity of 1980-
1991 pre-trend due to overlap with dependent variable in 1991, 1980-1991 pre-trends are instrumented using the
1980 earnings premium level in column (5). The 1970-1980 trend is weakly related to the 1980-1991 trend, so this
potential instrument is not utilized. First-stage partial F-statistics reported for instrumental variables specification.
*** Significant at the 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent level.
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Table 12: Regional log Wage Premia - All Workers - 2000, 2010
Change in log wage premium: IV
1980 earn
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Census - 1991-2000
Regional tariff change  0.413  0.432***  0.174  0.487***  0.843***
(0.342) (0.141) (0.137) (0.148) (0.326)
Earnings pre-trend (80-91) -0.274***  0.437*
(0.056) (0.260)
Earnings pre-trend (70-80) -0.088
(0.063)
State fixed effects (26) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R-squared 0.031 0.648 0.691 0.652
First stage partial F-Statistic 21.17
Panel B: Census - 1991-2010
Regional tariff change  0.583  0.165 -0.258  0.251  0.829
(0.510) (0.292) (0.233) (0.294) (0.531)
Earnings pre-trend (80-91) -0.438***  0.688**
(0.077) (0.302)
Earnings pre-trend (70-80) -0.151
(0.095)
State fixed effects (26) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R-squared 0.032 0.601 0.666 0.608
First stage partial F-Statistic 22.42
OLS
Decennial Census data. Positive coefficient estimates for the regional tariff change imply larger declines wages in
regions facing larger tariff declines. 411 microregion observations. Standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted for 112
mesoregion clusters. Weighted by the inverse of the squared standard error of the estimated change in the relevant
regional wage premium share. Due to a lack of hours information in 1980, pre-trends for earnings computed for 1980-
1991 and 1970-1980 periods. To address potential endogeneity of 1980-1991 pre-trend due to overlap with dependent
variable in 1991, 1980-1991 pre-trends are instrumented using the 1980 earnings premium level in column (5). The
1970-1980 trend is weakly related to the 1980-1991 trend, so this potential instrument is not utilized. First-stage
partial F-statistics reported for instrumental variables specification. *** Significant at the 1 percent, ** 5 percent, *
10 percent level.
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A Data Appendix and Supplemental Results
A.1 Tariffs
Tariff data come from Kume et al. (2003), who report nominal tariffs and effective rates of pro-
tection from 1987 to 1998 using the Brazilian industry classification Nı́vel 50. We aggregate these
tariffs slightly to an industry classification that is consistent with the Demographic Census data
used to construct local tariff shock measures. The classification is presented in Table A1. In aggre-
gating, we weight each Nı́vel 50 industry with its 1990 industry value added, as reported in IBGE
National Accounts data. Figure A1 shows the evolution of nominal tariffs from 1987 to 1998 for
the ten largest industries. The phases of Brazilian liberalization are visible (see Section 2 for a
discussion and citations). Large nominal tariff cuts from 1987-1989 had little effect on protection,
due to the presence of substantial nontariff barriers and tariff exemptions. In 1990, the majority of
nontariff barriers and tariff exemptions were abolished, being replaced by tariffs providing equiva-
lent protection; note the increase in tariffs in some industries in 1990. During liberalization, from
1990 to 1994, tariffs fell in all industries, then were relatively stable from 1995 onward.
A.2 Outcome Pre-Trends vs. Tariff Changes
Along with regional variation in the industrial composition of employment, our analysis relies on
variation in tariff cuts across industries. Here we analyze the relationship between tariff cuts during
liberalization (1990-1995) and trends in industry wages and employment before liberalization, 1980-
1991. We choose these two years in measuring pre trends because this is when Demographic Census
data are available. We implemented a similar analysis using another smaller household survey, the
PNAD, which is fielded yearly between Censuses. This allowed us to consider pre-trends from 1981-
1990 and 1986-1990, avoiding overlap with liberalization in 1991. The results were very similar to
the Census results presented here.
We implemented a variety of specifications, with results reported in Table A2. In all specifica-
tions, the independent variable is the proportional change in one plus the tariff rate (∆1990−95 ln(1+
τi)), shown in Figure 1. In panels A-C the dependent variable is the change in log industry earnings.
Panel A uses unconditional average industry earnings; Panel B uses industry earnings residuals con-
trolling for individual age, sex, education, and formal status; and Panel C uses average log earnings
residuals controlling for these individual characteristics and region fixed effects. In panel D, the de-
pendent variable is the change in log industry employment. Column (1) weights industries equally,
and presents standard errors based on pairwise bootstrap of the t-statistic, to improve small sam-
ple properties with only 20 tradable industry observations. Column (2) uses the same estimator,
but drops agriculture. Column (3) uses heteroskedasticity weights and presents heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors, which are likely understated in this small sample (MacKinnon 2011). Col-
umn (4) uses the same estimator, but drops agriculture. In all cases, the results should be seen
primarily as suggestive, because the analysis only uses 20 observations.
Nearly all of the earnings estimates are negative, indicating that tariffs fell more for industries
experiencing more positive wage growth prior to liberalization. The majority of the estimates are
insignificantly different from zero, with the exception of weighted results in Panels A and B. These
specifications heavily weight agriculture, which exhibited negative wage growth prior to liberaliza-
tion and experienced essentially no tariff decline during liberalization, driving the strong negative
relationship. By dropping agriculture, Column (4) confirms that the significant relationship is
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driven by agriculture. The employment estimates are larger, and change sign across columns.
Given the diversity of findings across wage and earnings specifications, this exercise is somewhat
inconclusive. Tariff cuts may or may not have been substantially correlated with pre-liberalization
outcome trends. These findings motivate us to control for pre-liberalization outcome trends in
the regional analyses presented throughout the paper. This ensures that our results are robust
to potential spurious correlation between liberalization-induced labor demand shocks and ongoing
trends.
A.3 Regional Tariff Changes
As a supplement to Section 4.2, here we present versions of Figure 2 for a number of additional
local labor markets. In Figures A2 - A4, we select states in each of Brazil’s major geographic
regions, and plot the 1991 distribution of employment across industries for the labor markets with
the most positive (light gray), median (medium gray), and most negative (black) value of RTCr in
the relevant state.
Amazonas state in the northwest of Brazil is sparsely populated and primarily agricultural.
However, the region facing the most negative tariff change in the state is Rio Negro, which mainly
does food processing and produces auto and electronics parts for the major assemblers in the nearby
free trade area of Manaus (omitted from the analysis). The median region is in the southeast of
the state, while the region facing the most positive regional tariff change is Boca do Acre, which
produces paper and agricultural products almost exclusively.
Pernambuco is a densely populated northeastern state. Caruaru faced the largest tariff decline
in the state, by virtue of specializing mainly in apparel and food processing. Ipojuca is a tourist
destination south of Recife, and faced the median tariff decline as a result of having a relatively
even distribution of employment across industries. Agrestina is in the rural interior of the state,
and faced the most positive tariff change as a result of its heavy reliance on agriculture.
São Paulo is a southeastern state, home to the metropolis of the same name. Aircraft manu-
facturer Embraer is located in São José dos Campos, which faced the most negative tariff change
in the state because vehicle manufacturing faced one of the larger tariff declines. Votuporanga has
a large furniture sector, which faced a middling tariff decline, so the city experienced the median
tariff change. Bananal, an ecotourism destination, faced the largest tariff decline due to a large
agricultural sector.
Santa Catarina is in the south of Brazil. Joinville is the largest city in the state, and faced the
most negative tariff change as a result of its diverse manufacturing base, including apparel, plastics,
and electronics. São Miguel do Oeste has large meat and milk processing industries and faced the
median tariff change in the state. Lages faced the most positive tariff change due to concentrated
employment in wood and paper industries.
Mato Grosso is a largely rural state in the center-west of Brazil. Cuiabá, the state capital, has
some heavy manufacturing and a number of major food processing operations, leading it to have
the state’s most negative regional tariff change. Matupá produces wood products and agricultural
goods almost exclusively, and faced the median tariff change. Paranatinga faced the most positive
tariff change by specializing in agricultural output, particularly cereals and oilseeds.
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A.4 Formal Earnings Regressions
Figure A5 shows the scatter plots underlying the formal earnings regression estimates in Figure 4
for 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. Each marker represents a microregion, and microregions in each
major region are shown with a separate type of marker. The size of each marker is proportional to
the weight the relevant microregion receives in the estimation. The mean value of the dependent
variable is normalized to zero in each year to focus attention on the slope.
These scatter plots make clear three important points about the earnings estimates. First, as
shown in Figure 4, the slope increases substantially and steadily over time, following liberalization.
Second, the relationship between changes in formal earnings premia and regional tariff changes
is approximately linear in all time periods, justifying our choice of functional form. Third, the
increasing slope is driven by shifts in earnings across large numbers of microregions in various parts
of the country rather than by a few outliers.
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Figure A1: Tariffs - 1987-1998
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   1988	   1989	   1990	   1991	   1992	   1993	   1994	   1995	   1996	   1997	   1998	  
Nominal tariffs from Kume et al. (2003), aggregated to the industry classification presented in Table A1. Ten largest
industries by 1990 value added shown.
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Industries sorted from most negative to most positive tariff change


















































































































































































Industries sorted from most negative to most positive tariff change
Caruaru (-.15) Ipojuca (-.1) Agrestina (-.03)
Industry distribution of 1991 employment in the regions facing the most negative, median, and most positive regional
tariff changes in the relevant state. Industries sorted by the tariff change, shown in Figure 1. More weight on the left
side of the figure leads to a more negative regional tariff change, and more weight on the right side leads to a more
positive regional tariff change.
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Industries sorted from most negative to most positive tariff change
















































































































































































Industries sorted from most negative to most positive tariff change
Joinville (-.15) São Miguel do Oeste (-.13) Lages (-.11)
Industry distribution of 1991 employment in the regions facing the most negative, median, and most positive regional
tariff changes in the relevant state. Industries sorted by the tariff change, shown in Figure 1. More weight on the left
side of the figure leads to a more negative regional tariff change, and more weight on the right side leads to a more
positive regional tariff change.
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Industries sorted from most negative to most positive tariff change
Cuiabá (-.13) Matupá (-.07) Paranatinga (0)
Industry distribution of 1991 employment in the regions facing the most negative, median, and most positive regional
tariff changes in the relevant state. Industries sorted by the tariff change, shown in Figure 1. More weight on the left
side of the figure leads to a more negative regional tariff change, and more weight on the right side leads to a more
positive regional tariff change.
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   1991	  
2000	  
2010	  
Decennial Census data. Industries sorted from most negative to most positive tariff change over 1990-1995 (see
Figure 1). Nontradable sector faces no tariff change, and is placed at the far right.
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weighted weighted, omitting 
agriculture
1980-1991 change in log: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: average earnings
Regional tariff change -0.345 -0.111 -1.029*** -0.510
(0.322) (0.354) (0.139) (0.582)
Panel B: earnings premia (with individual controls)
Regional tariff change -0.203  0.017 -0.610***  0.235
(0.273) (0.311) (0.157) (0.350)
Panel C: earnings premia (with individual and region controls)
Regional tariff change -0.135 -0.044 -0.184 -0.018
(0.177) (0.209) (0.158) (0.222)
Panel D: employment
Regional tariff change  1.564  2.669** -0.799*  1.638
(1.268) (1.331) (0.408) (1.868)
Observations 20 19 20 19
Decennial Census data. 20 industry observations (19 omitting agriculture). See text for details of dependent and
independent variable construction. Column (1) weights industries equally, and presents standard errors based on
pairwise bootstrap of the t-statistic. Column (2) uses the same estimator as Column (1), but drops agriculture.
Column (3) uses heteroskedasticity weights and presents heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Column (4) uses
the same estimator as Column (3), but drops agriculture. *** Significant at the 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
level.
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B Model – Not For Publication
B.1 Setup and Equilibrium Restriction
This section introduces a specific-factors model allowing for imperfect and slow factor adjustment. The
economy consists of many regions, indexed by r = 1...R, which may produce goods in many industries,
indexed by i = 1...I. Production in each industry exhibits constant returns to scale using two inputs (below,
we will additionally restrict production to be Cobb-Douglas). Labor Lr is assumed to be perfectly mobile
between industries within a region and an industry-specific factor Tri is usable only in its respective industry
i. Goods and factor markets are perfectly competitive, and producers face exogenous prices Pi, common
across regions and fixed by world prices and tariffs.
Consider a particular region r and suppress the region subscript. Let aLi and aTi be the respective
amounts of labor and specific factor used in producing one unit of industry i output. Letting Yi be output
in industry i, factor market clearing implies
aTiYi = Ti ∀i, (B1)∑
i
aLiY i = L. (B2)
Perfect competition implies that the price equals factor payments,
aLiw + aTiRi = Pi ∀i, (B3)
where w is the wage and Ri is the price of industry i specific factor.
We will consider the effects of price changes. Define x̂ as the proportional change in x, and let ϕi be the
cost share of the specific factor in industry i. Differentiating (B3),
(1− ϕi)ŵ + ϕiR̂i = P̂i ∀i, (B4)
which follows from the envelope theorem for cost minimization,
(1− ϕi)âLi + ϕiâTi = 0 ∀i. (B5)
Now we differentiate the factor market clearing conditions, and allow for the possibility that L̂ 6= 0 and
T̂i 6= 0.
Ŷi = T̂i − âTi. (B6)∑
i
λi(âLi + Ŷi) = L̂, (B7)
where λi ≡ LiL is the share of regional labor allocated to industry i. By definition, the elasticity of substitution
in production between Ti and L, satisfies
âLi − âTi = σi(R̂i − ŵ). (B8)
Combining (B6) - (B8) yields ∑
i
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Equations (B4) and (B9) can be expressed in matrix form as
ϕ1 0 . . . 0 1− ϕ1





0 0 . . . ϕN 1− ϕN





































Using Cramer’s rule, which in this case involves taking the determinant of a partitioned matrix, we can solve










i λiσi − λ
′Φ−1ϕL
(B12)
Since the inverse of the diagonal matrix Φ is a diagonal matrix of 1ϕi ’s, we can simplify this expression.
We also reintroduce regional subscripts and impose the restriction that all production functions are Cobb-












































Equations (B13) and (B14) represent equilibrium restrictions implied by the model. Changes in factor
supplies are themselves functions of changes in wages and specific factor returns, and hence are endogenous.
By holding factor supplies constant, we observe the changes in factor returns that occur on impact and that
generate the incentives for factor reallocation. Setting L̂r = T̂ri = 0 in (B13), it is clear that wages decline
more in regions facing larger average price declines, so labor has an incentive to reallocate away from those
regions to more favorably affected regions. For the specific factors, consider a change in the average regional
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specific-factor return:
∑
























































where the third equality uses the definition of βrj . Thus, before factor supplies adjust, the change in average
regional specific-factor return precisely equals the change in wage, such that both types of factors have an
incentive to reallocate away from places facing larger weighted-average price declines.
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